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 ABSTRACT 
A considerable volume of research has investigated the positive, as well as negative, 
effects of large assortments from a consumer perspective. Despite Business-to-
Business suppliers typically offering very large assortments though, similar inquiries 
have yet to be made in the context of professional purchase decisions. Thus, it is 
unclear if professional buyers suffer from the same negative effects (particularly 
choice overload), as consumers do, for example, reduced satisfaction when having to 
make a choice from a large assortment. The fact that a company’s buyer is account-
able for a purchasing decision is especially salient in differentiating professional 
buyers from consumers. Obviously, because buyers have a certain job or, more 
specifically, a role located somewhere in the hierarchy of a company, they will typi-
cally have a boss evaluating their job performance and, thus, holding them officially 
accountable.  
Furthermore, research has long postulated that a typical Business-to-Business 
purchase decision involves more than one person, since such decisions are made in 
a so-called buying center. This means that people, who do not hold a higher position 
in the hierarchy than the buyer, may influence the buyer’s purchase decision. For 
instance, user preferences often play an important role because users will have to 
work with the product purchased by the buyer and, in many cases, have relevant 
knowledge gained from experiencing a certain product class. However, in most 
companies, these users do not have the hierarchical position to evaluate the buyer’s 
performance but can still have a strong influence on the buyer. As Doney and 
Armstrong (1996) postulate, “enough complaints from [the users] and a buyer may 
soon be out of a job” (p.58). This latter form of accountability is classified as informal. 
Having identified this gap in research, this dissertation seeks to offer a contribution to 
the field by investigating whether negative effects from large assortments, specifically 
choice overload, exist in a Business-to-Business context, with a particular focus on 
the joint effects of assortment size and accountability. In addition, this dissertation 
investigates the effects of color-coding, i.e., using a certain color as a code for a 
certain attribute characteristic regarding the most important attribute(s) of a product. 
This is applied as a possible means of reducing negative effects on buyer satisfaction 
 which may exist in some circumstances when the buyer is choosing from a large 
assortment.  
To achieve these goals, a conceptual framework based on various research streams, 
e.g., on choice overload, the concept of the buying center and accountability, is 
developed and the effects investigated in three experimental studies. In detail, the 
conceptual framework postulates that informally accountable decision makers suffer 
from choice overload, with the result that satisfaction with their own decision process 
will decrease when they have to choose from large assortments. This effect is medi-
ated by the justifiability of the decision, with informally accountable decision makers 
experiencing reduced justifiability of their decision when choosing form large assort-
ments which, in turn, reduces their satisfaction. Moreover, this negative effect will be 
reduced when color-coding is applied to the assortment. These results have 
important implications for theory and practice regarding the ways assortments should 
be presented to decision makers in a Business-to-Business environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Eine Vielzahl von Forschungsarbeiten beschäftigt sich mit den positiven sowie nega-
tiven Auswirkungen großer Sortimente aus Sicht von Konsumenten. Überraschen-
derweise gibt es keine korrespondierenden Untersuchungen im Bereich professio-
neller Beschaffungsentscheidungen, obwohl Business-to-Business-Lieferanten 
typischerweise sehr große Sortimente anbieten. Es ist daher unklar, ob professio-
nelle Einkäufer unter denselben, negativen Auswirkungen wie Konsumenten, d.h. 
„Choice Overload“, leiden und somit ihre Zufriedenheit sinkt, wenn sie aus großen 
Sortimenten eine Kaufentscheidung treffen müssen. Der entscheidende Unterscheid 
zwischen der Kaufentscheidung eines Einkäufers im Vergleich zu einem Konsu-
menten ist die Tatsache, dass ein Einkäufer im Sinne seiner Tätigkeit für ein Unter-
nehmen Verantwortung für seine Entscheidung gegenüber anderen übernehmen 
muss. Da ein Einkäufer im Rahmen seiner Anstellung bzw. Rolle im Unternehmen an 
einer bestimmten Stelle in der Hierarchie angesiedelt ist, hat der Einkäufer typischer-
weise einen Vorgesetzten, der seine Arbeitsleistung beurteilt. Er besitzt daher ein 
formales Verantwortungsgefühl. Darüber hinaus hat die bisherige Forschung vielfach 
festgehalten, dass an typischen Einkaufsentscheidungen im Business-to-Business 
mehr als eine Person beteiligt ist, da diese Entscheidungen in einem sogenannten 
„Buying Center“ getroffen werden. Das bedeutet, dass Personen, die in der Unter-
nehmenshierarchie nicht höher gestellt sind als der Einkäufer, dennoch Einfluss auf 
seine Kaufentscheidung nehmen können. Beispielsweise sind Nutzerpräferenzen 
häufig sehr wichtig, da die Nutzer diejenigen sind, die später mit dem Produkt arbei-
ten müssen, das der Einkäufer gekauft hat. In vielen Fällen besitzen sie relevantes 
Wissen durch frühere Erfahrungen mit einer bestimmten Produktklasse. Obwohl 
Nutzer in den meisten Unternehmen nicht in der hierarchischen Position sind, um die 
Arbeitsleistung eines Einkäufers zu bewerten, können sie trotzdem einen gravieren-
den Einfluss auf den Einkäufer ausüben. Doney und Armstrong (1996) halten in 
diesem Zusammenhang fest: “enough complaints from [the users] and a buyer may 
soon be out of a job” (S.58). Die hier zu Grunde liegende Form des Verantwortungs-
gefühls wird als informell kategorisiert. 
Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, die oben beschriebene Forschungslücke zu schließen, 
indem sie überprüft, ob negative Effekte bedingt durch große Sortimente, d.h. 
 „Choice Overload“, auch im Business-to-Business-Bereich existieren. Im Fokus 
stehen dabei die kombinierten Effekte der Sortimentsgröße und des Verantwor-
tungsgefühls. Des Weiteren beschäftigt sich die vorliegende Dissertation mit den 
Auswirkungen von Farbkodierungen in dem Fall, dass für das oder die wichtigsten 
Produktmerkmal(e) einer bestimmten Merkmalsausprägung je eine bestimmte Farbe 
zugeordnet wird. Dies wird als mögliches Mittel zur Reduktion negativer Effekte auf 
die Zufriedenheit von Einkäufern angewendet, die unter bestimmten Umständen 
auftreten können, wenn Einkäufer eine Entscheidung für ein Produkt aus einem 
großen Sortiment treffen müssen. Um diese Ziele zu erreichen, wird ein konzeptio-
nelles Modell entwickelt, das auf bestehenden Forschungsrichtungen, bspw. aus den 
Bereichen von „Choice Overload“, dem Konzept des „Buying Centers“ sowie dem 
Verantwortungsgefühl, aufbaut und welches empirisch mit Hilfe von drei experimen-
tellen Studien untersucht wird. Im Detail postuliert das Modell, dass informell verant-
wortliche Entscheidungsträger unter „Choice Overload“ leiden, d.h. ihre Zufriedenheit 
mit ihren eigenen Entscheidungsprozessen sinkt, wenn sie auf Basis großer Sorti-
mente entscheiden müssen. Dieser Effekt wird mediiert durch die Einfachheit mit der 
die entsprechende Entscheidung aus Sicht des Entscheidungsträgers gegenüber 
anderen begründet werden kann, so dass informell verantwortliche Entscheider, die 
aus großen Sortimenten etwas auswählen müssen, eine gesenkte Begründbarkeit 
ihrer Entscheidung erleben, die dann wiederum zu einer geringeren Zufriedenheit 
führt. Weiterhin kann dieser negative Effekt abgeschwächt werden, wenn Farbkodie-
rungen auf das entsprechende Sortiment angewendet werden. Diese Effekte haben 
wichtige theoretische und praktische Implikationen für die Art, wie Sortimente für 
Business-to-Business Entscheidungsträger präsentiert werden sollten. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem Orientation 
Imagine you have recently started to work for a new employer and your profession is 
buying materials for use in a hospital. On one of your first days, your boss walks over 
to ask you to purchase surgical suture material. He informs you of some key facts 
about the application of the material, before leaving the responsibility with you. Since 
you do not have experience with the special kind of material that is needed, you 
decide to search the Internet for information and look into some online product cata-
logues. However, you are puzzled to see that you will have to make a choice from 
hundreds of alternatives because of the huge assortments various suppliers offer. 
After sitting at your desk trying to determine what you should do next, you decide to 
take a short break and get a coffee. While preparing your coffee in the kitchen you 
strike up a conversation with one of the doctors by coincidence. Surprisingly, she is 
one of the surgeons who will be using the material you have been asked to purchase. 
You wonder if it is a good idea to ask her about her preferences and knowledge of 
the material and choose to do so. Interested and happy to help, the surgeon tells you 
all the relevant details from her own perspective. 
Back at your desk, you start searching for products again, now feeling that you can 
make a good choice for the surgeon who will be operating with the material. How-
ever, because the number of alternatives you have to scan through to find the few 
products that fit your requirements is still overwhelmingly high, you soon become 
frustrated sifting through all these products. 
When you consider this situation of the buyer in a hospital who is about to purchase 
medical products that will be used by a doctor, and who has to make a choice from 
an assortment consisting of hundreds of products – which product will she choose 
and will the user be satisfied with it? Does she want to incorporate the surgeon’s 
preferences at all? Will she be afraid of making a wrong decision from the surgeon’s 
perspective or will she merely think about how her boss will evaluate her purchase 
decisions, e.g., consideration of factors like low costs? Finally, will she be satisfied 
with her choice and the offered assortments? 
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From the Business-to-Consumer (B2C) marketing literature, it is well known that 
consumers choosing from large assortments often suffer from so-called “choice 
overload” (see, e.g., Iyengar & Lepper 2000). This means that they are overwhelmed 
by the number of alternatives offered in large assortments and, therefore, experience 
cognitive overload, which can lead to frustration and confusion. As a result, consum-
ers are no longer able to engage in detailed trade-offs between different variants 
from one product line or between different brands (Menon & Kahn 1995; McAlister & 
Pessemier 1982). Consequences for decision makers are, amongst other things, 
decision delay or even deferral, as well as reduced satisfaction, e.g., with the offered 
assortment or, after the choice, with the product itself (see for example, Chernev 
2003b; Iyengar & Lepper 2000). 
While these findings increase understanding of consumer reactions to large assort-
ments, corresponding studies in the B2B sector are largely absent. Only Lakotta’s 
(2008) investigation made a first step in this direction by investigating the related 
construct of customer confusion in a B2B service setting. However, because Lakotta 
(2008) examined choice set formation processes and their consequences on choos-
ing an optimal supplier, but not, for instance, decision makers satisfaction with their 
purchase decision, it is not clear in any degree of detail how B2B decision makers 
experience variety.  
This amounts to a significant research gap for at least two reasons. First, in B2B 
firms, large assortments are the norm rather than the exception. Therefore, it seems 
likely that B2B decision makers will also suffer from choice overload or a similar 
phenomenon. However, research has also shown that consumers appreciate large 
assortments under certain circumstances. For example, when consumers have a 
clear idea of their ideal product in mind, they are highly satisfied with large assort-
ments because the probability of finding a product matching their preferences is 
higher when more alternatives are offered (Chernev 2003b). It could, of course, be 
possible that B2B buyers react in a similar way. Research has also shown that the 
way in which assortments are presented makes an important difference to consum-
ers (see, e.g., van Herpen & Pieters 2007; Diehl 2005; Morales et al. 2005; 
Broniarczyk, Hoyer & McAlister 1998). For instance, van Herpen and Pieters (2007) 
revealed that people do not experience strong negative consequences when choos-
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ing from large assortments that are color-coded. By applying color-coding, the char-
acteristics of the most important attribute(s), e.g., different flavors of a product are 
given certain colors, so that consumers can easily see which products are worth 
trading off against each other and which are not. Again, no similar studies for the 
B2B context exist, making it unclear how professional buyers would react to tech-
niques like color-coding. As a consequence of this paucity of research, it is worth 
investigating not only reactions to assortment sizes, but also certain forms of assort-
ment presentation. 
Second, industrial buyers face a very different decision and purchase process than 
typical consumers, in that the former are usually held accountable for their decisions 
and any consequences they have. Accountability refers to a person’s (implicit or 
explicit) expectation that she will be called to justify her actions at some point in time 
and/or give reasons for her decisions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). In a typical B2B 
purchase process, a professional buyer has to make a purchase decision for a prod-
uct that will be used by someone else. Often, a purchase decision is made in a so-
called buying center, which refers to several people with different roles and obliga-
tions having to conduct a purchase decision together. This is not to say that these 
different people are on the same hierarchical level, but rather that they have some 
form of influence on the purchase decision. The most important roles in a typical 
buying center are the buyer and the user of the product (Choffray & Lilien 1978; 
Sheth 1973). A buyer deciding on a product will, in most cases, feel accountable for 
her decision, as she is normally not the user of the product purchased. Put differ-
ently, imagine a person whose job it is to make the right decision when purchasing 
products for other people, which she herself will never use. The question arises, what 
will happen if she is offered a large range of almost identical products (i.e., substi-
tutes) to choose from? 
Despite the fact that accountability has been recognized as a key construct in under-
standing industrial buying processes, there is no research examining how account-
ability affects reactions to different assortments. In the context of B2B purchase 
decisions, two kinds of accountability can be distinguished: official and informal 
accountability (Doney & Armstrong 1996). Official accountability is based on hierar-
chical structures in an organization and means that buyers anticipate having to justify 
4 
their decisions to others who “possess the legitimate authority to evaluate their job 
performance” (Doney & Armstrong 1996, p.58). In other words, employees expect to 
give explanations and justifications to their bosses. While official accountability is 
easy to imagine, informal accountability might, at first glance, appear unusual in a 
B2B setting. However, Doney and Armstrong (1996) were able to show that informal 
accountability exists in a large number of firms. It took the form of buyers who felt a 
sense of being evaluated by subordinates, colleagues or peers who did not possess 
any legitimate authority over them, and who they wanted to please in some way. 
Thinking back to the example above of a buyer in a hospital, the buyer would feel 
accountable for the suture material she buys for the surgeons working in the hospital, 
i.e., the users of the product. The surgeon the buyer speaks to is neither her boss nor 
in a hierarchical position to evaluate her job performance, but still she wants to make 
a purchase that fulfills this surgeon’s needs and make a decision that satisfies the 
surgeon. Users, such as the surgeon in this example, can be very powerful and, as 
Doney and Armstrong (1996) postulate, “enough complaints from them and a buyer 
may soon be out of a job” (p. 58). 
Importantly, research by Polman (2012) showed that accountability in general and 
the number of options offered interact to effect the satisfaction of decision makers by 
generating choice overload. Nonetheless, Polman (2012) did not distinguish between 
official and informal accountability or investigate purchase decisions, but rather 
choices of university courses. He therefore used a student sample and it remains 
unclear how far these effects hold true for B2B decision makers. In summary, it is 
worthwhile examining these effects in detail. 
Against this background, the purpose of this dissertation is to gain a better under-
standing of the reactions of industrial buyers to exceedingly large assortments. First, 
it is necessary to show how different types of accountability affect initial evaluations 
of large assortments and more down-stream consequences, such as buyer satis-
faction. Second, assuming that a large number of B2B firms cannot, or do not want 
to, reduce the size of their assortments, it is important to examine how buyer reac-
tions to large assortments can be improved through certain techniques of assortment 
presentation, specifically color-coding. Ultimately, this research seeks to improve the 
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understanding of the joint effects of choice overload and accountability and to extend 
the existing research on color-coding. 
1.2 Research Question and Structure of this Dissertation 
The purpose of this dissertation is to show that choice overload can exist in B2B 
purchase decisions when choices from large assortments have to be made. Further-
more, it seeks to demonstrate that color-coding is a possible method of reducing 
negative effects of large assortments on decision makers. Thus, the joint or, in other 
words, interactive effects of assortment size, or, respectively, assortment presenta-
tion and accountability, are investigated with three empirical studies. The focal con-
struct is the satisfaction of the decision makers with their own decision making pro-
cess, since this project is interested in the perspective of the buyer. The dissertation 
also seeks to reveal the underlying psychological construct that leads to reduced 
satisfaction when the buyer has to choose from a large assortment, i.e., justifiability is 
investigated as a mediator. For the purpose of the empirical investigation of the 
described effects, a conceptual framework is developed that builds on existing liter-
ature from the fields of general effects of variety on decision makers and especially 
choice overload, the field of B2B purchase decisions, research on accountability as 
well as the joint effects of accountability and assortment sizes and research on 
assortment presentation. More specifically, this dissertation aims at answering the 
three following research questions: 
 
1. Does choice overload exist in B2B settings, where buyers are not users of the 
products they purchase but are held accountable for their choices? 
 
2. Do different forms of accountability, i.e., informal and official accountability, 
have different effects on the decision satisfaction of a buyer, especially when 
choices from large assortments have to be made? In other words, do large 
assortments affect the satisfaction of buyers subject to informal accountability 
differently from those held officially accountable? And if so, what is the under-
lying psychological mechanism that drives these effects? 
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3. How can decision satisfaction be improved when decision makers experience 
low levels of satisfaction arising from the joint effects of choice overload and 
accountability? Put differently, is color-coding a promising means of enhancing 
decision satisfaction in these circumstances? 
 
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 1 gives an introduction to the topic 
and proposes several research questions to be investigated in the course of the 
dissertation. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature from several research streams 
and concludes by offering a conceptual model that integrates these different fields. 
On this basis, several hypotheses are developed for empirical investigation in 
Chapter 3. To empirically prove theses hypotheses, a total of three experiments are 
conducted. These studies use different samples (B2B buyers and B2C decision 
makers), as well as different focal assortments and products, to broaden the theo-
retical and practical impact of the results. Details on the design, methods and results 
from the experiments are documented in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes by 
summarizing these results, discussing their implications for research and manage-
ment, while also acknowledging the limitations of the studies, before identifying 
promising directions for future research. This structure is summarized in Fig. 1-1. 
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Fig. 1-1: Structure of this dissertation 
Chapter 5: Discussion 
Summary of the results, discussion of implications and 
limitations, identification of future research opportunities 
 
Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis 
Presentation of the design and results of the three 
experimental studies 
Chapter 3: Development of Hypotheses 
Proposal of research hypotheses to be tested in three 
empirical studies 
Chapter 2: Conceptual Development 
Review of relevant literature from several research streams 
and development of a corresponding conceptual model 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Problem orientation for the dissertation and development of 
research questions 
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2 Conceptual Development 
This chapter provides a review of selected literature from the fields of variety seeking 
and choice overload, business-to-business purchase processes, accountability, 
including the joint effects of choice overload and accountability and different forms of 
assortment presentation. By combining contributions within each of these research 
streams a conceptual model for the dissertation is ultimately developed, followed by 
the construction of hypotheses for the empirical research in chapter 3. Importantly, 
the review of relevant literature in this chapter is not intended to offer a complete 
overview of all related research results and/or connected research streams, but 
instead, to give a focused summary of the most important findings from prior 
research which has particular relevance for the research questions at hand. 
2.1 Research on the Effects of Assortment Size 
The following sections will review literature on the effects of different assortment 
sizes, specifically, small versus large assortments, from a B2C perspective, since 
there is a dearth of work from the B2B perspective. Section 2.1.1 will summarize 
important findings on the positive effects of large assortments on decision makers, 
before explaining the negative effects in section 2.1.2 
2.1.1 Positive Effects of Variety 
An extensive volume of research in the fields of marketing and psychology has 
analyzed the effects that the number of alternatives (low versus high) to choose from 
has on consumer behavior (for literature reviews see Chernev 2011 and also 
McAlister & Pessemier 1982). What seems quite intuitive and well known from previ-
ous research is that an assortment offering plenty of variety appears attractive to 
consumers at first glance. A high number of options to choose from are appealing 
because consumers can anticipate finding their favorite product within the offered 
options (see, for example, Iyengar & Lepper 2000; Chernev 2003a). 
Occasionally, consumers also directly use large assortments to seek variety. There 
are numerous reasons for this, including: the need for stimulation or a desire to try 
out something new (Menon & Kahn 1995), a keenness to show others that an open-
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mind is being adopted by a consumer (Ratner & Kahn 2002; Ariely & Levav 2000), an 
uncertainty about their own future consumption preferences when buying several 
products for future consumption (Simonson 1990). Based on Givon (1984), it is 
assumed that variety seeking does not have to depend on a change in one’s actual 
preferences. That is, a consumer can still have the same favorite brand or product, 
but switch from it in a given situation. For example, imagine a person that prefers 
coffee to tea. Right after consuming one, or perhaps several, cups of coffee, she will 
choose a cup of tea not because coffee is no longer her favorite, but simply because 
she wants to drink an alternative at that moment (for a similar example with soft 
drinks see Menon & Kahn 1995). 
Set against this background, it becomes clear that in cases where consumption is 
repeated several times, consumers do not solely choose their favorite alternative, but 
also other options. This can be explained on the basis that consumers are unsure of 
their own future preferences, as mentioned before. Consumers choose more varied 
options and not only their favorite product when they have to decide what to con-
sume in a certain future period, e.g., the whole next week, at one single shopping 
trip. In other words, simultaneous choices for sequential consumption increase the 
number of different products from the same category that a consumer chooses 
(Simonson 1990). Furthermore, variety is sometimes incorporated into decisions 
because, in retrospect (i.e., when remembering the situation later), consumers value 
a varied consumption sequence more than one with less variety. It is important to 
note that consumers in this case do not move away from their favorite because of 
satiation. The switch happens, although consuming a higher number of alternatives 
reduces the pleasantness of the experience, while being in the situation of consump-
tion. Put differently, when a clear favorite exists and an intended switch occurs, only 
the memory of the situation, not the consumption experience itself, is influenced to be 
more pleasant. Still, this can sometimes be a strong enough reason for a consumer 
to switch products or brands (Ratner, Kahn & Kahnemann 1999). 
What is the downstream psychological mechanism behind this behavior? Why do 
people switch away from products they are satisfied with, and which are perhaps 
even their favorite? As already mentioned, sometimes people have a need for stim-
ulation. How strong this need is, or in which situations consumers explicitly expe-
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rience this need, e.g., by feeling bored, depends on their “optimal level of stimulation 
(OSL)” (Menon & Kahn 1995, p. 286). Stimulation, in turn, can stem from choosing 
certain objects and/or the choice situation itself, for example, how stimulating the 
assortment offered in a supermarket is perceived to be by a certain person. As a 
personal optimum exists, stimulation through varying product choices individually and 
stimulation through the number of products offered by a producer or retailer are 
compensatory in nature. This means that a shopping situation, which is stimulating 
because a greater variety is offered by a retailer for example, can lead to more stable 
brand choices and, vice versa, more stable brand choice can flow from a larger 
number of options offered (Menon & Kahn 1995). It ought to be born in mind, how-
ever, that situations do not only exist where stimulation appears to be low or moder-
ate, but also where stimulation is too high, even for those consumers with a high 
OSL. Under these conditions, consumers will try to avoid being confronted with the 
source of stimulation, be it a certain product category or supermarket shelf, or even a 
whole store, perhaps by avoiding supermarkets that offer too much variety (Raju 
1980). 
That said, it seems intuitive to limit the number of options offered to a certain amount, 
while still giving consumers the opportunity to vary their choices. In that vein, Morales 
et al. (2005) investigated the effects of limiting the number of options while still offer-
ing a large assortment. By offering consumers the possibility to use an online filter to 
reduce the number of options they see from an originally large assortment, they 
ensured that consumers still had a high number of variants to choose from without 
having to scan through all of the products. Although consumers were allowed to see 
all options if they wanted, taking a shortcut to the sub-category of products they were 
looking for, their satisfaction declined when products were filtered. Furthermore, they 
perceived the assortment as a whole to offer less variety, although the overall 
number of options was held constant in comparison to a control group, which just 
saw the whole assortment without any filtering. Ultimately then, the attractiveness of 
the assortment was lowered by the filter. This is especially interesting because 
Morales et al. (2005) used a large assortment offering 32 options to choose from. 
The next section will proceed to outline the negative effects of variety, before section 
2.4 provides more details on the effect of filters and other forms of presentation for 
large assortments. 
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2.1.2 Negative Effects of Variety 
All of the results discussed above lead to the conclusion that offering more variety 
has a negative, as well as positive, outcome. Supporting this, a famous study by 
Iyengar and Lepper (2000, Study 1) demonstrated that shoppers, when confronted 
with a promotional booth in a supermarket which offered jams to try, displaying either 
twenty four or six variants of jam, a significantly higher number of people stopped for 
the larger assortment. However, the same study revealed that this pattern reversed 
when it came to actual purchasing behavior, so that only 3 % of consumers who were 
offered the larger number of options purchased one of the jams of the focal brand, 
while almost 30 % of shoppers offered only six alternatives bought a jam. So, high 
variety of an assortment can be attractive when choosing between assortments, but 
not always when it comes to choosing among products within a certain assortment. 
At first glance, offering a large assortment may appear advantageous, but firms 
ought to be cautious of the effects that can stem from the number of variants they 
offer and situations where variety has negative effects on consumers. 
Regarding the definition of boundary conditions that shed light on circumstances, 
where (and where not) the offered variety has positive effects, Chernev (2003b) was 
able to show a difference in the consumer’s perception of assortment size depending 
on the preference structure of the particular consumer. A consumer holding well-
defined preferences, or, in other words, has an available ideal point regarding the 
attributes of a product, enjoys choosing from a larger assortment and can form 
stronger preferences from this choice and, thus, appreciates variety. However, a 
consumer who has uncertain preferences and does not actually know which combi-
nation of attribute characteristics best fulfills her needs, will be more satisfied when 
choosing from a smaller assortment. In the latter case, the consumer is likely to 
experience cognitive overload when required to choose from many alternatives 
(Chernev 2003b).  
This so-called choice overload, where the consumer has too many options to choose 
from, leading to cognitive overload, can have different effects, often referred to as 
overchoice effects (see, e.g., Gourville & Soman 2005). These effects can take 
various forms. For instance, a consumer can end up delaying her decision for a 
certain amount of time, or even totally desisting from buying one of the offered 
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products. Alternatively, in the case where the buyer makes a final choice and 
purchases at product, she can still can feel unsatisfied and come to regret her 
decision afterwards (see Chernev 2003b; Iyengar & Lepper 2000). These effects 
often stem from (anticipated) regret, meaning that when a consumer has a very large 
number of alternatives to choose from, she feels that she cannot be sure to make the 
right decision. By choosing one option, she has to reject all other options at the same 
time, which makes her feel uncomfortable; indeed, she might be truly afraid of 
choosing the wrong product. Even more so in the case of a large assortment, the 
buyer has to reject a very high number of seemingly good options, which can 
increase her regret when choosing a certain alternative, independent of the true 
value of the chosen alternative, i.e., if she has chosen the best option or not (Iyengar 
& Lepper 2000; Som & Lee 2012). As explained earlier, this underlying process is 
especially relevant for decision makers with uncertain preferences (Chernev 2003b).  
To summarize, it is necessary to distinguish between not only the different motiva-
tions for consumers strongly favoring variety, and thus a large assortment, but also 
the different kinds of decision makers. When a person knows exactly what kind of 
product she wants to buy, it is much easier for her to make trade-offs between exist-
ing alternatives and pick a good, if not ideal, product than in cases where she is 
unsure about what an ideal alternative would actually look like. 
Furthermore, to assess alternatives easily, they have to be comparable, or, in other 
words, alignable, in the first place, meaning that all options will have different attrib-
ute characteristics, but in total share the same attributes or, in other words, products 
can be compared along one dimension (Gourville & Soman 2005). If attributes as a 
whole have to be compared in a way that one can choose an attribute only by sacri-
ficing another and thus requiring trade-offs between the dimensions, the assortment 
is classed as non-alignable. An example of an alignable assortment would be a 
comparison amongst several car audio systems that all have the same features, such 
as USB connection, and only differ in their physical placement of the USB port. 
Comparing, however, different game consoles on the basis of exclusive features (i.e., 
one game console offers one feature and the other game console another feature 
instead) would be a non-alignable assortment. In the latter example, the consumer 
has to decide if she wants a game console that can play Blu-ray discs or a game 
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console that has voice control. Thus, her decision for one console and the corre-
sponding feature, e.g., voice control, is ultimately a decision against the other 
feature, e.g., playing Blu-rays. 
Both cognitive overload and anticipated regret are enhanced when an assortment is 
non-alignable, making overchoice effects likely (Gourville & Soman 2005). Regarding 
satisfaction with the choice process (not the outcome, i.e., the chosen product), or 
so-called decision satisfaction, alignable options enhance satisfaction, while non-
alignability decreases satisfaction. The same pattern as for non-alignable assort-
ments holds true for a limitation in the available number of options from a given set 
with equally attractive options. This is due to the ease of comparison when the given 
options are alignable and, contrastingly, the complexity of comparison for non-
alignable alternatives, as demonstrated by Zhang & Fitzsimons (1999). However, in 
the study just cited, the authors only used relatively small numbers of options to 
choose from (e.g., three brands with ten attributes each). As a consequence, their 
results are not clear regarding how limiting the number of options would affect satis-
faction when the assortment is larger. This point will be returned to in greater detail in 
section 2.4.1. 
Similar to Gourville and Soman’s (2005) study, Chernev (2005) showed that the 
likelihood of purchase for products from non-complementary assortments is higher 
than from complementary assortments. The definition of complementary is similar, 
though not identical, to non-alignability, since options are characterized by having 
features from different dimensions, while a non-complementary assortment would 
offer trade-offs along one dimension, i.e., among the different characteristics of one 
attribute, which amounts to an alignable assortment. The difference regarding the 
definition lies in the point that non-alignable products are distinguished by having one 
feature and, at the same time, not having all the other features by which other prod-
ucts are characterized (Gourville & Soman 2005). Complementary assortments, 
however, offer several different combinations of these features. By way of illustration, 
a car offering sport seats or a leather steering wheel would be characterized as 
having non-alignable features, while it would be characterized as complementary 
when it would principally be possible to order a car with both features in a certain 
package of features, where perhaps another package combines other features. 
14 
Importantly, Chernev (2005) revealed that consumers were more likely to defer a 
choice from a large assortment when it was characterized by complementary options 
compared to an assortment characterized by non-complementary options. Therefore, 
the choice can be seen as being more difficult, mirroring the results of Gourville and 
Soman (2005) in regards to non-alignable assortments. 
All studies mentioned above focus on decisions in a business-to-consumer (B2C) 
context. The question arises as to how far, if at all, these results can be transferred to 
a business-to-business (B2B) setting. The next section will first explain typical B2B 
purchase processes and compare these to a B2C context, while focusing on pur-
chase decisions from large assortments and possible overchoice effects. Second, 
findings on the factors important in influencing B2B purchase decision will be sum-
marized, including, for example, the risk of making a certain purchase. 
 
2.2 Research on Business-to-Business Purchase 
Processes 
Regarding consumers, Holbrook and Hirschman (1982), in a heavily cited article, 
have advanced that constructs like emotions, feelings, and even fantasies, can drive 
consumer behavior under certain conditions, for instance when buying a piece of 
fashion clothing or a ticket to a musical show. It is obvious that these contexts differ 
considerably from purchasing situations in a B2B context which involve a profes-
sional buyer who may have to buy, for example, machine tools. Nonetheless, in both 
B2C and B2B, there can be situations where decisions are mostly made due to 
cognitive analyses and rational reasons, along with an extensive information search, 
where people base their choices on rational reasons (Holbrook & Hirschman 1982; 
Hillier 1975; Shafir, Simonson & Tversky 1993). 
 What constitutes an important difference is the number of people involved in deci-
sion making processes. B2B purchase decisions are often formed in a buying center, 
which involves a number of different people, such as the user of a certain product, a 
professional buyer and a manager who confirms the decision (Choffray & Lilien 1978; 
Sheth 1973; Wind & Webster 1972; Webster & Wind 1972). According to Webster & 
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Wind (1972), typical roles include: users of the products and services purchased; 
buyers who handle the formal purchase process and negotiate with suppliers; influ-
encers who offer some relevant knowledge and influence the purchasing process 
directly or indirectly; deciders who formally make a decision, e.g., a manager with 
control over a budget; and gatekeepers, who control the dissemination of information 
within the buying center. Importantly, multiple roles can be held by one person 
(Webster & Wind 1972). In addition to these roles, Bonoma (1982) introduced the 
initiator, who is the person to first recognize a certain need for a product.  
In an extreme situation, a buying center could consist of one person that is the user 
of a product or service and makes a decision on her own, e.g., an engineer purchas-
ing, and afterwards using, particular software for blueprinting. When she has a 
budget and authority to make certain purchase decisions without assistance or ask-
ing for anyone else’s permission, it is possible that she buys the software without 
talking to anyone else about it. However, in most companies this will not be the case. 
Purchases will be made with at least a professional buyer, a user and/or initiator who 
articulates a specific need. Even if the buyer has the authority to decide over a cer-
tain amount of money on her own, users will, in most cases, be further involved 
(officially or unofficially) in the decision making process because ultimately they are 
the ones using the product and have relevant knowledge of the purchase.1 Therefore, 
this dissertation focuses on buyers and users, the most important of the roles when it 
comes to purchase decisions. Details about the underlying relational processes 
between those different roles will be explained from the buyer’s perspective in sec-
tion 2.3.1. 
Sheth (1973) introduced a regularly cited model revealing several important influ-
encing factors on B2B purchase decisions. A slightly adapted version of the model is 
shown in Fig. 2-1. It is worth noting that this early model already differentiates 
between purchase decisions a buyer conducts independent of others and those that 
are formed by a group of people. As can be seen in Fig. 2-1, regardless of whether a 
decision is made autonomously by a buyer or is arrived at as a group, several other 
                                            
1
 Also other models of the buying center than the one of Webster and Wind (1972) exist, e.g., Witte’s 
(1976) model or the buying network model (Johnston & Bonoma 1981), which are, however, not 
described in the context of this dissertation since they principally include the same relevant roles of 
buyer and user as well. 
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people influence the purchasing process through their expectations. Later research 
has also proven empirically that the distinction between an individual and group deci-
sion in the case of a B2B purchase is not dichotomous, but rather, that even when 
one individual (usually the buyer), is authorized to make a decision on her own, 
others will have varying influence on that decision, for example users (see, e.g., 
Doney & Armstrong 1996). 
Furthermore, it is especially important to consider the kind of purchase a company is 
planning. Among other dimensions, this depends on the risk that a certain purchase 
carries (see Fig. 2-1). Risk, in turn, depends strongly on the newness of the buying 
task. Situations include the purchase of something totally new to the company (new 
task), a straight rebuy of a well known product, or something in between, which is 
called modified rebuy. A modified rebuy is qualified by a known product or product 
category, but typically a change of the supplying firm (Robinson, Faris & Wind 1967).  
Tab. 2-1 describes these purchase situations in more detail in the so-called buyclass 
framework. It is important to note that the size of the buying center, amongst other 
aspects including speed of decision making, depends strongly on the kind of 
purchase task. For example, when a new task has to be conducted, the buying 
center typically involves more people and takes more time for decision making than 
when a (straight or modified) rebuy is made (Anderson, Chu & Weitz 1987; Dholakia 
et al. 1993). Since risk normally includes a perceptional component, it is imaginable 
that a degree of risk can flow from the assortment itself, e.g., the anticipation of 
regret when an assortment is large, linked to the fear of choosing the wrong option 
out of a vast number of seemingly similar products. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2-1: Model of industrial buyer behavior (slightly adapted from Sheth 1973, p. 51) 
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Bunn (1993) built on the categorization of buying situations in the buyclass frame-
work of Robinson et al. (1967) and developed a more detailed version describing a 
total of six different buying situations. In her re-worked framework, two kinds of 
modified rebuy situations exist: a simple and a complex modified rebuy, which differ 
according to buyer power and size of the choice set. However, with size of the choice 
set, Bunn (1993) refers to the number of possible suppliers in the market, whereas in 
this dissertation the focus is on the number of products offered by one supplier. 
Given that the only other variable on which the two modified rebuy situations differ is 
buyer power, which is not of primary interest in the context of this research, the two 
forms of modified rebuy situations are not explicitly distinguished in the further course 
of this dissertation. Thus, a modified rebuy refers to both forms, as in the situation 
described by Robinson et al. (1967) and which subsumes Bunn’s (1993) classifi-
cation. 
 
Type of Buying 
Situation (Buyclass) 
Newness of the 
Problem 
Information 
Requirements 
Consideration of 
New Alternatives 
New Task High Maximum Important 
Modified Rebuy Medium Moderate Limited 
Straight Rebuy Low Minimal None 
 
Tab. 2-1: Buyclass framework (Robinson et al. 1967, p. 25) 
 
A construct related to risk is purchase importance, referring not only to the financial 
importance of a purchase, but also the general influence it has on an organization 
(Bunn & Perreault Jr. 2006; Park & Bunn 2003). For example, when employees have 
to learn how to work with new software, this can be an important purchase, even if 
this software is not expensive. Importance is also sometimes conceptualized as a 
factor underlying the perceived risk of a purchase (Kohli 1989). Purchase importance 
could, among other effects, be shown to directly influence information search and 
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whether decision makers consider the long-term effects of a purchase (Hunter, Bunn 
& Perreault Jr. 2006; Park & Bunn 2003). The size of the buying center, that is, the 
number of people involved in a purchase process, is also usually greater when the 
purchase is important (Reve & Johansen 1982). 
Complexity of the purchase decision, e.g., a difficult evaluation task regarding the 
product alternatives being offered, also influences the purchase process. It leads, per 
definition, to the need for a greater amount of information to conduct a decision 
(McQuiston 1989), with a complex product category, requiring more effort to trade-off 
the available alternatives and reach a final purchase decision. Presumably, this 
should also be true for large assortments, especially when the purchase can be 
classified as important because the increased number of options makes the decision 
more difficult, or, in other words, complex. However, these effects should also exist 
for B2C decision makers when circumstances are similar, i.e., complexity and 
importance are high, as will be explained in more detail in section 2.3.2.1. 
It is important to note that B2B decision makers often face a lot of rules and formal 
requirements they have to fulfill when making purchase decisions, which can have an 
influence on the selection of a particular supplier and/or product (Hunter et al. 2006; 
Johnston & Lewin 1996; Wilson, McMurrian & Woodside 2001). This should lead to a 
certain amount of information needed to conduct a decision according to these 
requirements. For example, sometimes buyers have to apply a standardized process 
that necessitates collecting several bids from different suppliers before they are 
allowed to make a final decision as to which product and/or supplier they will choose 
(Wilson et al. 2001). As a result, this can further increase complexity of a purchase 
task. 
As strictly organized and rational B2B decision processes may appear so far, they 
are still conducted by human beings, as the described effects of complexity show. 
Mudambi (2002) has shown that different buyer clusters exist. One of these clusters, 
labeled “branding receptive” (p. 530), is influenced by factors like reputation and 
brand image of a supplier firm. Brand image, however, does not have to be driven 
solely by emotions, but can convey certain associations with high quality products 
(Bendixen, Bukasa & Abratt 2004). Thus, it can be, at least partly, rational to choose 
well-known brands as they can function as a heuristic for reducing perceived risk. 
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However, a brand as a cue for quality is, as stated before, only a decision heuristic 
and therefore not solely rational. In this context, Brown et al. (2011) were able to 
show that for very low and very high risk products, decision makers often depend on 
well-known brands so that the risk-brand sensitivity relationship is U-shaped. That 
said, brands should be most important for straight rebuy and new task purchase 
decisions, but not for modified rebuy situations. 
The results mentioned above show that of course some differences between B2C 
and B2B decision making exist, but that these differences are not as strong as one 
might expect and that many constructs, such as branding, are not solely relevant in a 
B2C or B2B context. Rather, in both situations, decision-making involves human 
beings with certain characteristics. Lakotta (2008) even showed that in a B2B con-
text, customer confusion (a construct similar to consumer confusion) could exist for 
certain purchase decisions. This leads to the conclusion that some constructs from a 
B2C context can be transferred to a B2B context because the underlying psychologi-
cal mechanisms are similar in certain circumstances. Recall, however, that in B2B 
decision making more people are regularly involved, which accounts for an important 
difference compared to B2C product choices. The following section will now explain 
why this is important and identify the relevancy of the psychological construct of 
accountability in this context. Afterwards, the conceptual connection to large assort-
ments will be discussed in more detail. 
2.3 Research on Accountability 
The next sections will summarize research results on accountability because of its 
significant role in decisions involving others. As stated before, the most important 
difference between B2C and B2B decision making in the context of this dissertation 
is that B2B decisions involve several people while B2C decisions are often con-
ducted based solely on an individual’s preferences. 
2.3.1 Definition and Forms of Accountability 
The psychological construct of accountability “refers to the implicit or explicit expec-
tation that one may be called to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others” 
(Lerner & Tetlock 1999, p. 255, based on the earlier work of Scott & Lymann 1968, 
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Semin & Manstead 1983 and Tetlock 1992). It is important to note that people giving 
justification for their actions or decisions are subject to consequences which can be 
positive or negative, depending on the extent to which the justification satisfies the 
person judging it (Lerner & Tetlock 1999). Furthermore, several different forms of 
accountability exist, ranging from the mere presence of other people who can see 
what one is doing to a situation where individuals have to explain their own behavior 
and give reasons for their decisions or are evaluated based on their actions (Lerner & 
Tetlock 1999). In the context of B2B purchase decisions, the last two forms of 
accountability are especially relevant because either predefined rules for behavior 
exist (e.g., a standardized buying process) and/or a buyer will be explicitly asked by 
her boss, why she decided to buy a certain product. 
While these distinctions are based on the consequences of accountability, there are 
several other differences in the forms that accountability can take. Most obviously, 
accountability can exist pre- or post-decisional, meaning that the individual at hand 
either notices the existence of accountability for her decision before action is taken or 
after she has already made a particular decision. This difference, as can be easily 
imaged, has the potential to lead to different behavioral consequences (Tetlock 
1992). A professional buyer is aware that she is held accountable for decisions 
because she is formally employed and paid to make purchases for a certain com-
pany, making accountability present pre-decision. In light of this, for the purposes of 
this dissertation only research regarding pre-decisional accountability is considered 
relevant. 
Another distinction made often in regards to accountability is its content, i.e., process 
and outcome accountability. For process accountability only the process employed to 
come to a decision matters, for example, the search for a certain amount of relevant 
information. In contrast, and as suggested by the label, outcome accountability refers 
to achieving the right consequences, e.g., choosing the right product, without consid-
ering the decision process (Langhe, Osselaer & Wierenga 2011; Ossege 2012). 
However, it is important to note that this distinction is not exclusive. For B2B pur-
chase decisions, it can be assumed that in most cases buyers are held accountable 
for the process and the outcome simultaneously (Doney & Armstrong 1996). In terms 
of the process, as explained, most B2B purchase decisions have rules attached, like 
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a requirement to consider a specific minimum number of possible suppliers before 
selecting one. Because companies are, by their very nature, profit-oriented, the 
outcome, for instance, how much money was spent on which purchase, matters at 
the same time. 
Accountability can also be characterized in terms of the individual(s) to whom 
accountability is owed, from which it is possible to distinguish between official and 
informal accountability. The former refers to the need to justify actions to superiors 
who have “legitimate authority to evaluate [someone’s] job performance” (Doney & 
Armstrong 1996, p. 58), based on labor contracts and organizational hierarchies. 
Informal accountability, in contrast, is a sense of having to justify decisions to subor-
dinates, colleagues or peers. In this case, no legitimate authority exists but the deci-
sion maker still feels a need to satisfy others with her decision (Doney & Armstrong 
1996).  
In a B2B purchase process, official accountability can result from the boss of a buyer, 
in the assessment of whether the buyer has made the right decisions according to a 
predefined process. Informal accountability, however, may flow from a user who is 
interested in the buying decision for a certain product. For example, buyers may feel 
accountable to a user because they know that it is worthwhile satisfying the user’s 
needs, such as when the user has experience of a product’s quality.  
2.3.2 Research on Different Effects of Accountability 
The next section will deepen the understanding of accountability by considering 
selected effects arising from the various forms of accountability. Having done so, 
initial findings on the interactive effects of accountability and assortment sizes will 
then be outlined. 
2.3.2.1 Behavioral Consequences of Decisions Involving Others 
Decisions for which a person is held accountable, by definition, incorporate at least 
one other person because the decision maker has, or at least feels, a need to justify 
her actions to somebody. Therefore, it is interesting to have a further look at the 
research on situations where other people play a role in a person’s decision making. 
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Several studies found that it can be positive to incorporate other people in an individ-
ual’s decision, in other words, to ask someone for advice, on the basis that advisors 
can balance their information search better, enabling them to look at conflicting 
information in greater detail and reach a better decision (Jonas & Frey 2003; Jonas, 
Schulz-Hardt & Frey 2005; Kray & Gonzalez 1999). This does not, however, hold true 
in all cases. When advisors in an experiment had to not only give advice, but also 
make a binding decision for someone else – making them strongly accountable for 
their decision – they were affected by a confirmation bias. This means that they 
searched more for information confirming than conflicting their initial preference 
regarding what would be best for their client. As such, they did not reach any better 
decisions than people deciding on their own, since these often suffer from the same 
bias (Jonas et al. 2005). These results also hold true for group decisions in homoge-
neous groups, i.e., a confirmation bias could be shown for groups who initially agreed 
on a topic (Schulz-Hardt et al. 2000) and groups with non-counterfactual mindsets 
(Kray & Galinski 2003). As a consequence, people often use defensive bolstering, 
where they give more arguments that confirm their view than challenge their choice 
in order to demonstrate to others that their decision was right (Jonas et al. 2005; 
Lerner & Tetlock 1999; Mojzisch et al. 2008).  
These findings illustrate the importance of noting that accountability does not auto-
matically lead to better decisions. This is especially worth mentioning in light of early 
research that suggested that holding people accountable for their actions could be a 
possible way of preventing certain biases (see Arkes 1991). Importantly, accountabil-
ity can, for instance, be shown to deepen the processing of information and, thus, 
leading to more accurate evaluations and reduced biases, e.g., primacy effects 
(Kruglanski & Freund 1983). Through these detailed evaluation processes, cognitive 
load is enhanced when people are held accountable (Lerner & Tetlock 1999).  
However, it has since become clear that not all forms of accountability affect decision 
makers the same way. Research has already investigated the differences of process 
and outcome accountability in various settings. Process accountability has often 
been shown to lead to a more in-depth processing of information and, consequently, 
when a certain amount of relevant information was available it has led to better 
decisions (see Lerner & Tetlock 1999 for a review on early studies; see also De Dreu 
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et al. 2006), while outcome accountability has revealed negative effects on decision 
quality (e.g. Siegel-Jacobs & Yates 1996). Importantly, Siegel-Jacobs and Yates 
(1996) demonstrated that people under both forms of accountability tried to reach 
better decisions, and thus were motivated to make accurate choices. Despite that, 
process accountability led people to consider more information, sometimes even 
irrelevant information (Siegel-Jacobs & Yates 1996).  
However, if process accountability has positive effects, does not only depend on the 
kind of information considered, but also on the conditions of the specific decision 
task. Langhe, Osselaer and Wierenga (2012) showed that the complexity of the task 
forms an important boundary condition because process accountability only improves 
judgments when the task is easy compared to when it is complex, and requires a 
holistic approach to evaluation. 
It is also possible that people held accountable for a decision try to suppress their 
own preferences, confirming instead the expectations of the person holding them to 
account and appearing to share their opinion, an effect known as acceptability heu-
ristic (Tetlock 1992). Another effect also related to the perceptions of the accounta-
bility holder, is prosocial behavior or so-called preemptive self-criticism, by which 
people incorporate more alternatives, and engage in multidimensional thinking, to 
defend their view against anticipated criticism from others. However, it is interesting 
to note that despite including more arguments and counterarguments into their 
decision making process, people engaging in such behavior do not reach better 
decisions (Lerner & Tetlock 1999; Ossege 2012). This can stem from political 
behavior to protect one’s self through demonstrating to others that one has made the 
right decision, outweighing the positive effects of a more thoughtful evaluation of 
alternatives (Ossege 2012). 
In a similar vein, decision makers sometimes engage in a symbolic information 
search, reviewing a large amount of information just to show that their decision was 
right. Doney & Armstrong (1996) surveyed professional buyers and found that both 
official and informal accountability has a tendency to enhance symbolic information 
search. Buyers held accountable for the process of decision-making, however, ana-
lyzed information more extensively without engaging in symbolic search. Those 
buyers only accountable for the outcomes of their decisions, not the process, 
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engaged in neither symbolic search behavior, nor extensive analysis of information 
(Doney & Armstrong 1996). An earlier study by Fandt and Ferris (1990) demon-
strated that accountability interacts with ambiguity and self-monitoring, leading to the 
conclusion that people manipulate information for reasons of self-impression. For 
example, when accountability is strong and ambiguity is low, information is presented 
in a way that seems convincing, creating an image that the right decision was made. 
Accountability in Doney and Armstrong (1996)’s study can assumed to be high 
because buyers were asked about real experiences and not hypothetical scenarios, 
making it plausible that buyers used the amount of information they searched to 
signal accuracy in their decision making processes. 
The question arising now is whether a large number of alternatives, offering a lot of 
information to base a decision on, is helpful for decision makers being held to 
account, or whether it has certain drawbacks, such as overchoice effects like 
reduced satisfaction with one’s choice. If the latter is the case, it would be interesting 
to see if these effects differ from those for individual decision makers who are not 
held to account, and also if these effects vary under different forms of accountability. 
The next section seeks to shed some light on these considerations. 
2.3.2.2 Joint Effects of Accountability and Choice Overload 
Tetlock (1992) stated that decision makers held to account sometimes defer deci-
sions (when possible) if they become complex and negative consequences from a 
wrong choice are likely. This effect appears similar to research findings on choice 
overload: If possible, decision makers try to avoid an uncomfortable decision, in this 
case from a large assortment, by delaying it or not deciding at all (see 2.1.2). Building 
on this idea, Polman (2012) analyzed the relationship between accountability and 
choice overload regarding satisfaction. In his study, students chose courses for the 
next semester either for themselves or for another student. Those students who were 
held accountable (i.e., were told that they would have to justify their choices to their 
professor afterwards), experienced less satisfaction when choosing from a large 
versus a small number of alternatives, regardless if the decision was for themselves 
or someone else. For students who were not held to account, this overchoice effect 
only applied when they had to decide for themselves while they were more satisfied 
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with a larger number of alternatives when choosing for another student (Polman 
2012, Study 5).  
Cognitive load and, correspondingly, choice overload, could possibly be increased by 
accountability because, as research has demonstrated, decision makers held to 
account, in some cases at least, engage in careful elaboration of alternatives,  and, 
thus, invest greater cognitive effort (Chaiken 1980; Kruglanski & Freund 1983; Lerner 
& Tetlock 1999). This cognitive effort could lead to negative consequences when a 
large number of alternatives have to be considered. Put differently, overchoice 
effects are magnified by accountability because additional cognitive effort is required. 
It is arguable that this increased effort could lead to more stimulation and, thus, 
individuals with high OSL should experience positive effects from the combination of 
accountability and a large assortment. However, it ought to be remembered that even 
for those who appreciate a highly stimulating environment, optimal stimulation is not 
the highest possible stimulation. Rather, at some point they will experience over-
stimulation, as explained in 2.1.1. Importantly, in Polman’s (2012) study, the students 
held accountable were told that they would have to justify their course selection to 
their class’ professor afterwards. It is not clear, therefore, if the subjects felt officially 
or informally accountable. They could have seen their professor as either someone 
who could legitimately judge their decision (official accountability) or, alternatively, as 
someone more similar to a peer or colleague without legitimate authority over 
themselves (informal accountability). These different views might have influenced the 
underlying process, leading to more or less satisfaction, for example, by affecting 
how motivated the students were to elaborate on their course selection and, in turn, 
how satisfied they felt about the size of their course options. In this vein, it is worth 
keeping in mind that larger choice means more cognitive effort is required for an 
evaluation of the different alternatives. 
This raises the question of the extent to which different forms of accountability foster 
cognitive effort and choice overload when one has to make a decision to buy a cer-
tain product. It is self-evident that only pre-decisional accountability can lead to 
increased evaluation effort compared to situations without accountability. Regarding 
differences of process and outcome accountability, the former, in particular, should 
lead to more cognitive effort when evaluating alternatives. Nonetheless, as stated 
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before, in many situations people are held process and outcome accountable at the 
same time, i.e., simultaneously (Doney & Armstrong 1996). Notably, Polman (2012)’s 
research did not distinguish between these two forms of accountability.  
In a B2B context, people have to make the right decision and, at the same time, 
explain how they arrived at it. Thus, in a B2B purchase situation, both forms of 
accountability can be inseparably combined. This should lead to a strong feeling of 
accountability and, as a result, heightened effort when trading-off alternatives. Espe-
cially, when the assortment one has to choose from, is complex, e.g., when alterna-
tives are distinguishable through non-alignable or complementary attributes cognitive 
effort is increased further and, of course, as the number of alternatives grows, effort 
is as well. It is not clear, however, from previous research if this raised effort always 
leads to reduced satisfaction. It is possible to imagine situations where cognitive 
effort is high due to official accountability, but satisfaction with the decision process 
remains high although the process is challenging because deep elaboration on a 
decision is considered part of doing a good job.  
It seems plausible that the distinction between informal and official accountability 
does affect the extent to which an individual experiences accountability. In a B2B 
setting at least, official accountability ought to be most salient and strong, for exam-
ple when a person has to justify a decision to her boss. Informal accountability, on 
the other hand, should still increase cognitive effort in decision-making compared to a 
situation without accountability, such as when someone only has to decide for her-
self. If, for instance, a professional buyer wants to satisfy a user of a product who 
does not have legitimate authority over her, the buyer will still put some effort in her 
decision, perhaps trying to adopt the user’s perspective and make additional trade-
offs with the user in mind. Of course, making a wrong or sub-optimal decision does 
not have as serious consequences for the buyer as would be the case if the user was 
her boss, responsible for formally evaluating her performance. 
It is important to acknowledge that these processes are not exclusive to B2B set-
tings. Official accountability, or something very similar, can even be seen when a 
mother asks her child to go to the supermarket and buy the groceries for dinner. If 
the child does not buy what has been asked for, its mother will not be able to cook 
the planned dinner and become angry, in which case the child will have to deal with 
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its mother’s negative emotions as a consequence of its own actions. Since the 
mother can be said to hold a sense of legitimate authority over her child, this situation 
could be classified as official accountability from the child’s perspective. Informal 
accountability in a B2C setting could also arise, for example, when deciding between 
two kinds of chocolate to buy as a present for a friend. No serious consequence from 
choosing one chocolate over the other will arise, but more effort will still be put into 
this decision-making when compared to choosing a chocolate for one’s own con-
sumption.  
It also seems that the cognitive effort stemming from decision situations under 
accountability will surely increase further when there is considerable item choice 
because more trade-offs have to be made. Importantly, how much effort a decision 
maker invests also ought to vary depending on the form of accountability involved. 
This effort will, in turn, influence how easily the decision can be justified to others 
because it is easier to provide compelling reasons when possible alternatives have 
been carefully evaluated (Shafir et al. 1993). Finally, the decision maker’s own satis-
faction with the decision process, i.e., decision satisfaction, will be influenced by 
justifiability (Heitmann, Lehmann & Herrmann 2007). Fig. 2-3 outlines these underly-
ing processes and the corresponding conceptual model and Fig. 2-2 shows the 
detailed effects of the interaction of assortment size and accountability on justifiabil-
ity, which mediates the relationship with decision satisfaction, demonstrating that 
when justifiability is enhanced, satisfaction is raised too. As explained before, it can 
be assumed that officially accountable decision makers have more motivation and, in 
turn, invest more cognitive effort into decision making, therefore experiencing a 
higher justifiability of their own decision. 
A point worth engaging with now is how firms could help their customers to feel better 
with their decisions, given that when they are held accountable for decisions they 
experience less satisfaction. How can a buyer be sure to have chosen the right 
alternative when there are so many products to review and trade-off against each 
other? And even when a decision has been made, regret can arise due to the belief 
that a better option existed. This seems to be especially true in situations of informal 
accountability when the motivation for a detailed trade-off of alternatives is relatively 
low. It is, therefore, important to simplify trade-offs between alternatives for these 
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cases so that decision makers can feel more comfortable about their own decisions 
and, consequently, more satisfied afterwards. This could, among other possibilities, 
be achieved by lowering the cognitive effort involved in comparing alternatives in an 
assortment. The next section will consider the possibility of guiding decision makers 
through large assortments through the adoption of different forms of presentation so 
that buyers do not experience cognitive or, more specifically, choice, overload. 
 
Fig. 2-2: Impact of assortment size and accountability on justifiability 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2-3: Conceptual model illustrating the effects of assortment size 
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2.4 Research on Different Forms of Assortment Presenta-
tion 
This chapter will provide an overview of different selected forms of assortment 
presentation, in light of changing variety perceptions and/or satisfaction of decision 
makers. Though many forms of assortment presentation exist, those selected and 
described in this chapter are limited to a small number that appear promising to solve 
the central problem of this dissertation: how to increase decision satisfaction for 
informally accountable decision makers choosing from large assortments in B2B 
settings. Importantly, and as reasoned above, buyers can experience reduced satis-
faction when cognitive effort is raised, which, in turn, means that satisfaction can be 
increased by reducing the effort required in making a certain decision or, in other 
words, making a decision more mentally convenient (Shugan 1980; van Herpen & 
Pieters 2007). Based on this, forms of assortment presentation that could facilitate 
decision-making by reducing cognitive effort are the focus of this chapter. Tab. 2-2 
provides a platform for such a discussion by giving an overview of the different kinds 
of assortment presentation that will be taken into account. 
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Form of Assortment 
Presentation 
Effects on Decision Mak-
ers 
Exemplar Studies 
Reduction of the number 
of items offered while 
making use of symmetry 
or other physical forms of 
presentation 
Perception of variety can 
be held constant, be 
reduced or increased 
Broniarczyk et al. (1998) 
Kahn & Wansink (2004) 
Hoch, Bradlow & Wansink 
(1999) 
Use of online filters to 
facilitate the search of 
suitable alternatives 
Satisfaction with the 
assortment is reduced; 
choice quality can be 
reduced 
Morales et al. (2005) 
Diehl (2005) 
Categorization through 
labels or colors 
Satisfaction can be 
increased and decision 
making costs and effort 
can be reduced 
Mogilner, Rudnick & 
Iyengar (2008) 
van Herpen & Pieters 
(2007) 
Nagengast, Heidemann & 
Rudolph (2013) 
 
Tab. 2-2: Overview of different forms of assortment presentation 
 
2.4.1 Physical Changes of Assortment Presentation 
A lot of research exists which considers retailers’ possibilities to structure and present 
assortments in ways that influence consumers’ perceptions, e.g., signaling more 
variety than is actually offered in an assortment (see, for example, Broniarczyk et al. 
1998; Morales et al. 2005). Several studies have shown that retailers can reduce 
assortment size by eliminating items from a certain product category that are not 
bought frequently (Boatwright & Nunes 2001; Dreze, Hoch & Purk 1994; Broniarczyk 
et al. 1998). When shelf-space for the category is held constant after the elimination 
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of certain products, consumers do not perceive less variety amongst the options 
remaining. Consumers will still choose to buy from that particular retailer as long as 
their favorite option is among the available alternatives (Broniarczyk et al. 1998). As 
a result of the number of alternatives to trade-off being reduced, cognitive effort and, 
correspondingly, the potential for choice overload, should also be lowered. This 
approach, however, supposes that buyers already know what their ideal product 
looks like. Furthermore, when reducing the number of items it must be ensured that 
only those not bought frequently or by key customers are eliminated from choice. 
Since B2B customers are more diverse in their needs than B2C customers (Homburg 
2012), this is not a realistic solution in many cases. 
Importantly, Hoch, Bradlow and Wansink (1999) demonstrated that a) assortment 
presentation can not only foster perception of variety, but also lower perceptions 
under certain circumstances and b) that satisfaction with the assortment offered by a 
retailer can vary according to certain ways in which the assortment is presented. For 
instance, when engaging in analytic processing, consumers perceive an organized 
assortment to offer more variety than an unorganized assortment, while it is the 
opposite way around for consumers who engage in holistic processing. Similarly, van 
Herpen and Pieters (2002) illustrated that variety perceptions based on the attribute-
level and, thus, comparing the different characteristics of the attributes for several 
products, are higher than variety perceptions on the product-level, i.e., comparing the 
product as a whole to other products from the same category, while using the same 
assortment in both cases.  
Interestingly, Broniarczyk and Hoyer (2010) highlight that albeit being conceptually 
different, the models of Hoch et al. (1999) and van Herpen and Pieters (2002), 
produce similar results regarding assortment size perception from a mathematical 
point of view. However, as revealing as these results may be, they do not appear in a 
form that can realistically be implemented to reduce cognitive effort of decision 
makers in practical B2B settings. If the buyer processes the products in a holistic 
manner or on the attribute-level, remains unclear and hard to alter in a B2B purchase 
decision. 
Kahn and Wansink’s (2004) work developed this one step further by analyzing 
assortment organization forms in greater detail. They showed that the symmetry of 
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an assortment influences consumption behavior, with consumers choosing more 
sweets when the assortment is asymmetric, as compared to symmetric, in its organi-
zation. Furthermore, organized assortments increase the number of sweets eaten 
when compared to disorganized assortments. These effects stem, at least partly, 
from the differing perceptions of variety of the assortments offered. However, in their 
research, Kahn and Wansink (2004) did not include an analysis of satisfaction with 
the different assortments and choices.  
Indeed, it is important to note that these studies were interested in consumption 
quantities, not in decisions for single products, and therefore it is not clear whether 
participants felt satisfied with their decisions or not. However, in practice it will not be 
possible to show a symmetric assortment to a buyer in a B2B setting when alterna-
tives for presentation have to be doubled in order to do so, as conducted by Kahn 
and Wansink (2004) in their research. This is especially so because prior studies 
have shown that redundant items in an assortment can have negative effects on 
consumers’ evaluations of the assortment as a whole, in a B2C retail context at least 
(Boatwright & Nunes 2001). Thus, there would be a high risk that a buyer would not 
choose a supplier offering an assortment with redundant options and choose to 
switch to a competitor. 
2.4.2 Changes of Assortment Presentation by Using Filters 
Another promising form of assortment presentation is a filter, which is often used in 
online environments. Typically, at the very least a B2B buyer knows the product cate-
gory she is looking for. In other words, when searching a supplier’s website or online 
shop, she could enter into a mask what she wants to buy, e.g. sealings, and the 
results would be filtered by that category, so that she only sees results for sealings 
or, with a more granular filter, sealings for certain applications. Morales et al. (2005, 
Experiment 3) used this kind of filtering technique in an experiment with students who 
had to choose a certain kind of bag. As mentioned already in section 2.1.1, partici-
pants reported that they perceived the assortment to contain less variety when it was 
filtered compared to conditions without the filter. This could lead people to be less 
likely to choose a retailer or producer offering such a filter in the first place because 
the assortment appears less attractive (Morales et al. 2005; Iyengar & Lepper 2002). 
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In fact, participants in the study by Morales et al. (2005) reported less satisfaction 
with the assortment when they were confronted with the filter. Although cognitive 
overload can be reduced with the filter, a supplier should be careful when deciding 
whether to adopt such filtering techniques in practice, since they reduce the attrac-
tiveness of an offered assortment, which could lead buyers to switch to another 
supplier. In a B2B context, this is especially important for new task situations where a 
buyer evaluates suppliers and products in detail. 
Diehl (2005) also analyzed how filters influence consumer satisfaction. In her studies, 
options were not only filtered but also ordered from “best” to “worst” based on their fit 
with the presumed preferences of consumers reviewing the alternatives. Surprisingly, 
Diehl’s results revealed that consumers made worse choices when compared to 
those made without ranking the alternatives, choice quality was reduced, meaning 
that how good the chosen alternative matched the consumers’ preferences. It is 
worth noting that this effect was even stronger when consumers had a higher 
accuracy motivation. Their choices were even worse in these cases (Diehl 2005, 
Study 3). This result is important because accountability, especially official and/or 
process accountability, can lead to similar processing as accuracy motivation 
because people held to account officially and/or by process are motivated to reach 
accurate decisions, as already explained in chapter 2.3.2.1. In line with this reason-
ing, filters and ordered lists recommending the seemingly best options do not appear 
to be a solution to reduce cognitive load that increases buyer’s satisfaction in a B2B 
context. 
2.4.3 Changes of Assortment Presentation by Using Categorization 
Techniques 
It has been demonstrated that labeling categories inside an assortment can increase 
decision makers perception of variety and, as a consequence, improve their choice 
satisfaction, even when the categories are uninformative, i.e., labeled A, B, C, etc. 
(Mogilner et al. (2008)). However, this effect only holds true for decision makers who 
have limited experience with the focal product category. Since product categories in 
the studies of Mogilner et al. (2008) were magazines and coffee, it can be assumed 
that most participants have bought a similar product at least once before, even if they 
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did not buy it frequently from these categories. In a B2B context, this would amount 
to a modified rebuy decision process. In contrast, this kind of purchase process could 
lead B2B decision makers to investigate the options offered more thoroughly than 
consumers considering simply their own preferences would because buyers are held 
accountable for their decisions and financial risk is generally higher in B2B settings it 
is not clear, therefore, whether these processes would hold true for B2B buyers. 
Furthermore, since buyers are not the users of a product, meaning that only satisfac-
tion with the decision process, not with the chosen product, is relevant in this context, 
it is again unclear if categories could be a means of helping the buyer to make and 
then justify a decision, thereby increasing satisfaction with it. 
In a similar vein to categorization, van Herpen and Pieters (2007) investigated how 
assortment presentation could influence anticipated identification and decision-
making costs for an assortment and, consequently, reduce cognitive effort involved in 
the decision. They used different forms of color-coding to make differences between 
the alternatives offered, more salient and easier to process. In detail, they compared 
color-coding on item level to color-coding on attribute-level. Item-level coding refers 
to a form of making each single product distinguishable from the other products 
offered in an assortment by assigning a certain color to each item. On attribute-level, 
only the most important attribute of a product category is coded with a certain color. 
In other words, all products with the same characteristic of this attribute are coded 
with the same color, e.g., all chocolate bars with dark chocolate are labeled with the 
same red color and all chocolate bars with whole milk chocolate are assigned with 
the same blue color. The authors were able to show that for large assortments, color-
coding on attribute-level led to reduced anticipated identification and decision-making 
costs. As discussed before, this equals a reduction in cognitive effort used to trade-
off alternatives against each other. Focal product categories in the studies of van 
Herpen and Pieters (2007) were potato chips and chocolate, which most participants 
should have been fairly familiar with. However, as fictitious assortments were used in 
the study’s decision situations they are close to a modified rebuy task. It is, however, 
unclear if there was a positive effect on decision satisfaction since this construct was 
not investigated by van Herpen and Pieters (2007), leaving open a promising avenue 
for research that will be addressed in this dissertation. 
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Importantly, color-coding at attribute-level can be considered very similar to categori-
zation as investigated by Mogilner et al. (2008) because it adds information to an 
assortment that helps to identify and distinguish alternatives. Colors are very easy to 
process and should have an advantage over categorization by names. It has also 
been shown in previous research that colors reduce search costs and help consum-
ers orientate themselves when confronted with an assortment (Nagengast, 
Heidemann & Rudolph 2013).  
In light of these findings of the salience of color in purchase settings, this dissertation 
investigates color-coding as a possible means of increasing satisfaction of buyers. As 
outlined earlier, because large assortments are typical in B2B settings, color-coding 
will be implemented on attribute-level, i.e., for coding the most important attribute(s), 
in line with the results of van Herpen and Pieters (2007). Importantly, color-coding is 
most promising in circumstances where decision makers are held informally account-
able because this can reduce decision satisfaction when the assortment they have to 
choose from is large, as explained in section 2.3.2.2. The proposed effects and 
underlying processes of attribute-level color-coding under informal accountability are 
shown in detail in Fig. 2-4. 
The experimental studies in this dissertation focus on modified rebuy situations. A 
straight rebuy, per definition, would not need an evaluation of alternatives and a new 
task decision process would not benefit as much from an attribute-level coding or 
other means of categorization. This is because decision makers do not know which 
attributes are important for the decision and would have to process alternatives in a 
very detailed manner, regardless of assortment presentation. A modified rebuy, on 
the other hand, presents a situation where a decision maker has some experience 
with the product category, but chooses to buy from a new supplier and is thus con-
fronted with a new assortment. This is a realistic scenario that could occur occasion-
ally for an experienced buyer in practice. In this case, color-coding at the level of the 
most important attribute(s) seems to be a promising way to help the decision maker 
identify the relevant products from the assortment offered and, by doing so, make the 
decision more mentally convenient. In other words, cognitive effort will be reduced 
and overload will be decreased, while a large number of alternatives can still be 
offered. Significantly, an assortment under these conditions can include a high 
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number of options, which means it appears attractive to the decision maker. It is 
worth noting that in a modified rebuy decision an ideal point does not necessarily 
exist, with the result that overchoice effects are likely to occur, whereas this will not 
be the case for a straight rebuy.   
Another distinction worth making is between decision makers under official and 
informal accountability. While those held officially accountable should be highly 
motivated to evaluate alternatives in detail, and thus should not benefit much from 
color-coding, those under informal accountability are not as strongly motivated and 
will therefore benefit from a mentally convenient assortment presentation. Fig. 2-5 
shows the effects of assortment presentation, namely color-coding and accountabil-
ity, on decision satisfaction for choices from large assortments. The next chapter will 
develop detailed hypotheses regarding the conceptual model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2-4: Effects of attribute-level color-coding on decision satisfaction under informal 
accountability 
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Fig. 2-5: Impact of assortment presentation and accountability on decision satisfac-
tion (large assortments) 
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3 Development of Hypotheses 
3.1 Testing Choice Overload under Accountability 
Polman (2012) revealed that choice overload, resulting in diminished satisfaction 
when choosing from a large number of options, occurred in situations where people 
make a decision for someone else and are held accountable for that decision. How-
ever, as already explained, Polman (2012) did not distinguish between different 
forms of accountability. Thus, taking a first step, this dissertation seeks to shed 
greater light on how assortment size and accountability interact by incorporating 
official versus informal accountability into research on the effects of assortment size 
(small compared to large).  
As argued earlier, official accountability should strengthen the motivation of an indi-
vidual to closely consider the alternatives offered, even when an assortment is large, 
mirroring extensive information search under official accountability (Doney & 
Armstrong 1996). Although cognitive effort is enhanced, satisfaction of decision 
makers should not be reduced because they know that their job is to have a closer 
inspection of the details. Large assortments appear attractive due to an expectation 
that the ideal product is amongst the options offered (Iyengar & Lepper 2000), and 
the decision-maker ought to feel comfortable with a large assortment. However, 
given that a small assortment – at least one that offers products fitting one’s prefer-
ences or given specifications well – creates less elaboration effort, a buyer should 
feel equally satisfied with such an assortment.  
For informally accountable decisions makers, the situation appears to be different. As 
already explained, in a B2B context at least, informal accountability should not be as 
salient as official accountability due to less serious consequences flowing from a 
colleague’s evaluation compared to the performance evaluation of a boss. Because 
of this, a decision maker under informal accountability should not be as motivated to 
make detailed trade-offs between alternatives, compared to a decision maker under 
official accountability. Thus, when an informally accountable decision maker is 
offered a large assortment, she will be less satisfied because she can anticipate that 
considerable cognitive effort will be required to compare the products, while, at the 
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same time, she will be reluctant to invest this effort. Against this background, remem-
ber that the person to whom the decision maker feels accountable to does not have 
legitimate authority over her. Therefore, in most cases, she is unlikely to be highly 
motivated to match this person’s preferences perfectly, but rather seeks an easy way 
to satisfy that person. Since a small assortment, by definition, does not have as much 
potential for trade-offs between alternatives as a large assortment, the decision for a 
product becomes less demanding and, in turn, satisfaction with the decision making 
process should increase.  
These explanations ultimately lead to the following two hypotheses: 
 
H1A: When decision makers are held officially accountable, they will experience 
equal decision satisfaction when choosing from small and from large 
assortments. 
 
H1B: When decision makers are held informally accountable, they will experience 
more decision satisfaction when choosing from small than from large 
assortments. 
 
What is of further interest is the underlying process that explains how the interaction 
of accountability and assortment size influences satisfaction with a decision process 
(decision satisfaction). Digging deeper, a construct closely tied to accountability is 
justifiability. When someone is held accountable, by definition, they expect to have to 
explain their decisions in some way or, in other words, they know that they will have 
to justify their actions to someone else. This can lead to a choice goal in the form of 
trying to maximize the justifiability of a decision (Bettman, Luce & Payne 1998; 
Heitmann et al. 2007). Justifiability, then, strongly depends on the assortment offered 
because choices from some assortments should be easier to justify than choices 
from certain other assortments. For example, it is easy to explain a decision relating 
to a product when it dominates the other products around it that also share the same 
relevant characteristics (Bettman et al. 1998). Furthermore, justifiability influences 
decision satisfaction positively because when a decision is easy to justify individuals 
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are likely to get the impression they have chosen the right product (Heitmann et al. 
2007). This should be particularly relevant when a person’s goal is to reach a deci-
sion that is easy to justify but, simultaneously, is reluctant to engage in the effort 
required to process the alternatives. In other words, decision makers under informal 
accountability will experience different effects of assortment size on decision satis-
faction because justifiability ought to differ when choosing from a small versus large 
assortment. This is due to the fact that these decision makers are not motivated to 
make detailed trade-offs between the offers from a large assortment and, thus, do 
not reach high justifiability easily when they are faced with a large number of options 
to choose from (Shafir et al. 1993). It is apparent that these decision makers do not 
want to invest much cognitive effort, yet they will still want to raise the justifiability of 
their decision because of a sense of accountability.   
Officially accountable decision makers are motivated to put high cognitive effort into 
decision making, regardless of the size of the assortment offered, and, therefore, 
they should experience equally high justifiability and, in turn, decision satisfaction, 
from both small and large assortments. This can be explained by the fact that they 
will scan for alternatives that potentially align with their goals and preferences, and 
will engage in detailed trade-offs between these relevant alternatives. Consequently, 
it allows them to give good reasons for their choice, increasing the justifiability of their 
decision, irrespective of the total number of alternatives offered. 
These different processes under the two forms of accountability just described lead 
to the following hypothesis:  
 
H2: Justifiability will mediate the interactive effect of assortment size and 
accountability on decision satisfaction. 
 
Since satisfaction can fall under certain circumstances (when assortments are large 
and the decision maker is informally accountable), the next section will deal with 
hypotheses based on raising satisfaction through color-coding as a possible means 
of reducing the negative effects from large assortments. 
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3.2 Testing the Effects of Color-Coding under Account-
ability 
On the question of how decision satisfaction with large assortments for informal 
accountable decision makers can be enhanced – since those decision makers were 
postulated to be less satisfied – color-coding has already been introduced as a 
promising idea. As van Herpen and Pieters (2007) showed, color-coding on attribute-
level can improve the ease of decision making when assortments are large. Of fur-
ther interest is how this will affect decision satisfaction and how color-coding interacts 
with different forms of accountability. The focus of this research is confined to large 
assortments since small assortments are easy to process and, therefore, do not 
require special forms of presentation to strengthen the satisfaction of decision mak-
ers.  
As previously explained, officially accountable decision makers ought to be highly 
motivated to evaluate all options offered in detail, regardless of assortment size. As a 
consequence, they will not benefit from color-coding because it does not offer them 
further information about the products. It only makes important product characteris-
tics more obvious. On the other hand, color-coding should be helpful for informally 
accountable decision makers because they are less encouraged to evaluate all 
alternatives in depth when a large number of options are offered. Benefitting from the 
ease and convenience offered by color-coding, these decision-makers should be 
more satisfied (van Herpen & Pieters 2007; Shugan 1980). Recall that color-coding 
on attribute-level makes it easy to see at first glance which products boast the rele-
vant characteristics, indicating quickly which items should be investigated further, 
speeding up the process and reducing search costs. It is only for these products that 
trade-offs have to be made (van Herpen & Pieters 2007; Nagengast et al. 2013).  
It is also worthwhile investigating the comparative impact of accountability on deci-
sion makers and the situations they face. How will a decision maker feel who is 
deciding on her own and  is not incorporating preferences of others in her decision, to 
which she is accountable? She ought to experience more convenience and ease 
when making such a decision compared to accountable decision makers. Further-
more, it will be remembered that this dissertation focuses on modified rebuy situa-
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tions and, thus, on situations qualified by a moderate purchase risk (Robinson et al. 
1967). Therefore, a non-accountable decision maker does not have to fear the very 
serious consequences that might arise from a wrong decision, albeit she does not 
make a totally habitual decision. Compared to situations with accountability, the 
decision maker has no need to justify her decision to someone else and should, 
therefore, anticipate less serious consequences from the decision. Returning to 
consider the impact of color-coding, this situation suggests that because the decision 
is already relatively convenient without the coding, that satisfaction will not be 
improved by the introduction of such a technique. The decision maker does not have 
to explain her decision afterwards and, because of this, does not have to engage in a 
detailed trade-offs of all alternatives in order to give good reasons for a decision. 
Instead, she can quickly scan through the alternatives and pick the one that is 
intuitively preferred. Also, because the decision maker only has to incorporate her 
own preferences, it should be relatively easy to find an alternative well suited to 
these, as she does not have to recall the preferences of someone else. Three 
hypotheses are born out of this reasoning:  
 
H3:  People choosing under official accountability will be equally satisfied when 
choosing from a color-coded assortment versus an assortment without color-
coding. 
 
H4:  People choosing under informal accountability will be more satisfied when 
choosing from a color-coded assortment versus an assortment without color-
coding. 
 
H5:  People choosing without accountability will be equally satisfied when choosing 
from a color-coded assortment versus an assortment without color-coding.  
 
The next chapter will reveal how the hypotheses were empirically investigated using 
three experimental studies. 
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4 Empirical Analysis 
This chapter will report the three experiments and one pre-study conducted for this 
dissertation. It begins with an overview of the three experiments, before proceeding 
to explain each in greater detail, outlining the sample used in each study, the 
methods of data collection, as well as manipulations, stimuli and measures and, 
finally, discussing the results and implications of each experiment. 
4.1 General Overview of Experiments 
As mentioned previously, the three experiments were conducted to test the hypothe-
ses stated in chapter 3. Experiments provide an ideal way of collecting data in the 
given context for two main reasons. Firstly, they enable the researcher to control for 
certain factors, while simultaneously manipulating the variables of interest and using 
stimuli that are comparable to their real-world equivalents (Carson et al. 1994). 
Secondly, the research streams used to derive the hypotheses have generally used 
experiments to demonstrate any relevant inter-relationships. These streams are: 
accountability (see, for example, Polman 2012; Fandt 1991), choice overload, effects 
of variety and assortment size, respectively (e.g., Chernev 2003a; Chernev 2003b; 
Gourville & Soman 2005), and color-coding (e.g., van Herpen & Pieters 2007; 
Nagengast et al. 2013),  
It was not possible to test all hypotheses in a single experiment so, instead, three 
experiments were conducted that build on each other’s results. Experiments 1 and 2 
simultaneously collected data from real B2B buyers, while Experiment 3 replicated 
and extended the findings from the first two studies with another sample that was not 
limited to B2B decision makers. Experiment 1 examined if choice overload, i.e., 
reduced satisfaction from large assortments, exists under different forms of account-
ability (hypotheses H1A and H1B). This experiment also explored the underlying 
process by showing how the interactive effects of assortment size and accountability 
on decision satisfaction are mediated by the justifiability of a decision (H2). After 
obtaining these basic results, Experiment 2 was designed to show the effects of 
attribute-level color-coding on decision satisfaction under informal versus official 
accountability when choices from large assortments have to be made (hypotheses 
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H3 and H4). Experiment 3 replicates these results (H3 and H4) with another sample 
and in a different choice context (i.e., a different kind of assortment) and also tested 
how color-coding affects decision satisfaction when subjects are not held accounta-
ble at all (H5). Again, only large assortments were investigated. In sum, each of the 
experiments complemented and advanced one another. 
All three studies were conducted as online experiments and used scenarios to 
manipulate the variables of interest. Scenarios seemed most appropriate in the con-
text of this research since they help subjects to visualize a certain situation, with the 
purpose of studying the underlying processes of (consumer) behavior. This technique 
is particularly suited for investigating subjective reactions to certain procedures or 
stimuli (Lind & Tyler 1988). Scenarios have already been successfully implemented 
in other studies researching the effects of variety and accountability (see, e.g., Som 
& Lee 2012; Polman 2012). 
To generalize the findings of the three experiments conducted for this dissertation, 
different product categories were used for Experiments 1 and 2. Experiment 3 used a 
service (the choice of a restaurant) to create the assortments that subjects had to 
choose from, thereby extending the generalizability of the results. Section 4.2 will 
give more detail on the chosen research contexts. While Experiments 1 and 2 used 
real B2B buyers as subjects, Experiment 3 used a random online sample and thus 
was not exclusive to a B2B context. The details for the choice of this sample will be 
explained further in section 4.5.1. Fig. 4-1 gives an overview of the three experiments 
regarding the independent variables studied, as well as the analyzed sample and the 
hypotheses that were tested in each experiment. 
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Fig. 4-1: Overview of the experiments 
 
Experiment 3: Joint Effects of Color-Coding and Accountability in a 
B2C Setting 
Independent Variables: Accountability & Assortment Presentation 
Analyzed Sample: 241 participants (random online sample) 
Hypotheses Tested: H3, H4 (replication) & H5 (all confirmed) 
Experiment 2: Joint Effects of Color-Coding and Accountability in a 
B2B Setting 
Independent Variables: Accountability & Assortment Presentation 
Analyzed Sample: 102 buyers from German hospitals 
Hypotheses Tested: H3 & H4 (all confirmed) 
Experiment 1: Joint Effects of Assortment Size and Accountability in a 
B2B Setting 
Independent Variables: Accountability & Assortment Size 
Analyzed Sample: 103 buyers from German hospitals 
Hypotheses Tested: H1A, H1B & H2 (all confirmed) 
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4.2 Research Contexts of the Experiments 
As already mentioned, Experiments 1 and 2 were conducted in a B2B setting. In light 
of the rationale for the research questions at hand, it was important to use products 
for which large assortments exist in reality. In a typical modified rebuy decision, which 
is the focus of this dissertation, a certain number of – in most cases – standardized 
products will exist, from which the buyer chooses a single alternative. Therefore, it 
was important to choose focal product categories for the experiments in which pro-
fessional buyers, at least initially, consult the online or offline product catalogues of 
their suppliers to search for the right alternatives on their own. Importantly, this dis-
sertation is interested in purchase decisions where the buyer and the user of a prod-
uct are not the same person.  
An investigation of different branches and product categories revealed that several 
medical products used in hospitals fit these criteria. The product categories chosen 
for Experiment 1 were trousers that function as uniform for the nursing staff. Typical 
suppliers offer about 50 different variants of such trousers.2 For Experiment 2, surgi-
cal suture material was chosen since typical suppliers offer more than 1,000 variants 
of sutures.3 Indeed, hospitals are also ideal for investigating decision situations 
where the buyer is not the user of a certain product, since users, for example, doc-
tors, do not conduct purchase decisions themselves. Rather, they are occasionally 
asked about their experience with certain products by buyers, suggesting that buyers 
may have some sense of being informally accountable to those they casually seek 
advice from. 
Experiment 3 was conducted with a B2C sample, with the selection of a restaurant 
for a work-related event as the focal decision. This ensured that decision makers 
could easily imagine the choice situation, whilst also allowing the options offered to 
still be realistic in a B2B, as well as a B2C, setting.  
The next chapters will describe the stimuli and the three experiments in more detail. 
                                            
2
 The number of variants is based on information from a buyer in a local hospital as well as online 
shops; for an example of the latter see: http://www.7days.de. 
3
 Numbers are based on 2014 online catalogues of typical suppliers, which are Covedien, Ethicon and 
B.Braun. 
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4.3 Experiment 1: Joint Effects of Assortment Size and 
Accountability in a B2B Setting 
4.3.1 Design, Participants and Procedure 
Experiment 1 used a 2 (assortment size: small versus large) x 2 (accountability: 
informal versus official) between-subjects design.4 Subjects remained the same for 
Experiment 2 and the order of studies was counterbalanced among participants. A 
total of 103 buyers from German hospitals participated in the study. Of the partici-
pants, 71 (68.9 %) were male and 32 (31.1 %) were female. 83 (80.6 %) of the buy-
ers had managerial responsibility, while 16 (15.5 %) had none and 4 (3.9 %) did not 
specify when answering the question. The average age of the participants was 45.4 
years. Most of the buyers (95; 92.2 %) were employed full-time, while 8 (7.8 %) 
worked part-time. On average, they were in their current job position for 10.8 years 
and had generally worked as buyers for 15.3 years. More than half of the hospitals 
for which the buyers worked (52; 50.5 %) were run by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) while just over a third (37; 35.9 %) were public hospitals and 
over a tenth (14; 13.6 %) were commercially run. The number of beds per hospital 
was 557 on average. Buyers were contacted via telephone and asked if they wanted 
to participate in an online experiment. As an incentive, participants were informed 
that when they completed both studies 5 € was donated to a certain NGO. The 
donation was funded by a company sponsor. This kind of incentive was chosen 
because buyers in a professional context are usually not allowed to take incentives 
for themselves due to the anti-corruption compliance programs that most firms and 
hospitals have nowadays. 
A total of 1,824 addresses of hospitals in Germany were collected. However, 1,193 
had to be eliminated from the list because either they did not have a purchasing 
department5 and/or a surgical ward, which was needed because of the focal product 
categories, especially in Experiment 2, or they were generally not allowed to partici-
                                            
4
 Results of Experiments 1 and 2 were already partly presented in a working paper: see Schaffrath & 
Wentzel 2015. 
5
 Many hospitals share one purchasing department nowadays or have outsourced their purchases to 
an external service provider. 
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pate in studies due to the hospital’s standards and rules. Thus, 631 potential hospi-
tals or buyers, respectively, were left remaining. Of those, 260 could not be reached 
via telephone, e.g., they did not pick up their phone, although several attempts were 
made. In sum, 371 buyers were reached through calls and 218 agreed to be sent the 
link to the online experiments via email. The other 152 buyers were either not inter-
ested in the study or could not participate due to time constraints. Of the 218 buyers 
who had received the link, 103 filled out both studies completely. This amounts to a 
response rate of 28.8 %, on the basis of 371 buyers being called. When compared to 
an average response rate of 27.0 % found in a review by Bartholomew and Smith 
(2006) of small firms, the response rate reached in this dissertation can be consid-
ered satisfactory. Importantly, it ought to be noted that while hospitals may be large 
employers, most only have a small number of employees working in administration 
and management, meaning they are most accurately placed alongside small firms 
when it comes to their constraints in taking part in studies, e.g. time constraints.  
The procedure for carrying out the studies was as follows. For Experiment 1, buyers 
were told that they had to buy new work wear for their hospital. They were randomly 
assigned to a scenario with either informal or official accountability. The accountabil-
ity manipulation was held constant over Experiments 1 and 2 to prevent confounding 
effects between the two studies that could arise from their different accountability 
manipulations. Since the order of the studies was counterbalanced, participants were 
either randomly assigned to an accountability manipulation in Experiment 1 or in 
Experiment 2, depending on the specific study order, albeit every participant read a 
specific scenario for each of the studies. An overview of the procedure of Experi-
ments 1 and 2 is shown in Fig. 4-2. Importantly, the order of the studies did not have 
a significant influence on the dependent variables of interest (all ps > .61). 
In Experiment 1, participants in the condition with official accountability were told that 
they had to justify their decision to their boss, while informally accountable subjects 
were told that they could, but did not have to, incorporate the preferences of the 
nurses of the hospital they worked for, which would have to wear what they bought. 
Afterwards, buyers were shown either a small or a large assortment of trousers (work 
wear) and had to pick one of the products. After their choice, participants rated their 
decision satisfaction with, and justifiability of, the decision, as well as overload, on 
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respective scales. They also filled out a series of covariates, confound and manipula-
tion checks. Participants took on average 16:49 minutes to complete Experiment 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4-2: Procedure of Experiments 1 and 2 (order was counterbalanced) 
*: Accountability was either official or informal in both Experiments 
 
4.3.2 Manipulation of Independent Variables 
Two different scenarios were created to manipulate the form of accountability. As 
mentioned before, the manipulation of accountability, i.e., informal versus official 
accountability, was held constant over Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, although both 
experiments used different scenarios that were adapted to the product categories the 
buyers had to choose from. In Experiment 1, buyers were confronted first with the 
accountability manipulation through a scenario and then shown either a small or 
large assortment, from which they had to choose a product. 
4.3.2.1 Manipulation of Accountability 
Accountability was manipulated through different scenarios, which explained to 
whom a buyer should feel accountable and whether this person had legitimate 
authority over the buyer. In the case of the official accountability manipulation, par-
ticipants were told that their decision would be important for the hospital and would, 
therefore, be evaluated by their boss. In the scenario for informally accountable 
buyers, the boss was not mentioned. The scenario only explained that the nurses 
working for the hospital’s surgery had certain preferences that the buyer knew about 
which could, but did not have to be, incorporated into his or her decision.  
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Thus, accountability was manipulated by a) varying the hierarchical status of the 
person the buyer should feel accountable to and, consequently, b) varying whether or 
not legitimate authority over the buyer existed. All other descriptions were kept as 
constant as possible. For example, the descriptions in the scenarios explaining which 
product specifications a buyer had to search for were the same for both accountabil-
ity manipulations. To make the situation as realistic as possible, buyers were told to 
know basic characteristics of the purchase situation from their own experience, while 
either the boss or the nurse produced more specific, detailed preferences. The exact 
manipulations were as follows6: 
 
Official accountability: Imagine that you have to buy new work wear. In par-
ticular, you have to purchase new trousers for the female nursing staff in your 
hospital. From your experience with past purchases you already know the 
following: The trousers should be available in sizes XS to XXL. The trousers 
have to be chlorine bleachable and machine washable at a hot temperature. 
The price per trouser should be as low as possible. Furthermore, your boss 
tells you that the trousers need to be offered in a red and a green color and 
the fabric should contain a high proportion of cotton. He further tells you that 
the trousers should have as many pockets as possible for practical reasons 
relating to work in the hospital. Since this purchase is important for the 
hospital, your boss will evaluate your purchase decision in great detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
6
 All studies in this dissertation were conducted in Germany so that the original descriptions used in all 
three experiments were in German. 
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Informal accountability: Imagine that you have to buy new work wear. In 
particular, you have to purchase new trousers for the female nursing staff in 
your hospital. From your experience with past purchases you already know 
the following: The trousers should be available in sizes XS to XXL. The 
trousers have to be chlorine bleachable and machine washable at a hot 
temperature. The price per trouser should be as low as possible. 
Furthermore, you come to talk to one of the nurses from the surgery and she 
tells you that it would be great if the trousers were offered in a red and a 
green color and if the fabric contains a high proportion of cotton. She further 
tells you that the trousers should have as many pockets as possible for 
practical reasons relating to work in the hospital. Because you think that the 
needs of the nurse are reasonable, you promise her that you will incorporate 
them if possible. 
 
4.3.2.2 Manipulation of Assortment Size 
After reading the scenario with the accountability manipulation, participants were 
shown an assortment of trousers from which they had to choose one. The large 
assortment consisted of eleven alternatives and the small assortment included a 
subset of the large assortment with a total of six alternatives. To ensure realistic 
offers, these assortment sizes and the characteristics of the trousers were based on 
typical assortments of online shops selling corresponding work wear. The descrip-
tions of the stimuli (the trousers), were displayed in a table showing the following 
dimensions: name of the trouser, description of the trouser, material, care instruc-
tions, price per trouser, available colors and sizes. Examples of the stimuli are shown 
in Tab. 4-1. The complete stimuli can be found in Appendix 1.  As would realistically 
be the case when purchasing most trousers, an alignable or non-complementary 
assortment, was chosen for this experiment. 
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Name Description Material 
Care 
Instructions Price in € 
Available 
Colors & 
Sizes 
Sandra 
straight 
cut, 
1 hip 
pocket 
50 % polyester, 
50 % cotton 
machine 
wash hot, 
chlorine 
bleachable 
39.95 
 
light brown: 
S – XXL 
mandarin 
orange: 
S – XXL 
grey: 
S – XXL 
white: 
S – XXL 
 
Sylvia 
straight 
cut, 
1 hip patch 
pocket 
100 % cotton 
machine 
wash warm, 
do not bleach 
32.99 
 
white: 
XS – XXXL 
chocolate 
brown: 
S – XXXL 
light yellow: 
M – L 
dark red: 
XS – XXL 
mint green: 
XS – XXL 
 
Tab. 4-1: Example of stimuli in Experiment 1 
 
4.3.3 Selection of Measures 
4.3.3.1 Dependent Measures 
Two dependent measures, namely decision satisfaction and overload, were taken in 
Experiment 1. Decision satisfaction was measured with five items based on a scale 
from Heitmann et al. (2007). The original scale consisted of six items, of which one 
(i.e., “I would be happy to choose from the same set of product options on my next 
purchase occasion.”) was left out because it did not fit within the context of the study. 
The items used to measure decision satisfaction for Experiment 1, which were also 
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employed in Experiments 2 and 3, are listed in Tab. 4-2. The scale demonstrated a 
satisfactory level of reliability in Experiment 1 (α = .75).  
Overload was measured with two items (“The number of options was overwhelming.” 
and “The shown information was overwhelming.”) from Morales et al. (2005). This 
scale produced a highly satisfactory level of reliability (α = .96). 
 
Items for Decision Satisfaction  
I think the process of deciding which product to buy was not difficult. (adapted) 
I found the process of deciding which product to buy interesting. 
I was satisfied with my experience of deciding which product option to choose. 
Several good options were available for me to choose between. 
I thought the choice selection was good. 
 
Tab. 4-2: Items for decision satisfaction (reduced and slightly adapted version of the 
scale from Heitmann et al. (2007)) 
 
4.3.3.2 Mediator 
As explained in section 3.1, justifiability was proposed as a mediating factor on the 
interactive effect of assortment size and accountability. This construct was measured 
using a scale consisting of three items (i.e., “I thought it would be easy to justify a 
purchase decision, in case someone challenges it.”, “I was able to see at first sight 
that some products were superior.”, “In order to decide for one product, it was not 
necessary to make any difficult trade-offs.”) from Heitmann et al. (2007). This scale 
again showed a satisfactory level of reliability (α = .74). 
4.3.3.3 Covariates 
Two covariates, namely situational involvement and self-construal, were incorporated 
into the study. Generally speaking, covariates are metric independent variables that 
affect the results in a way that is not controlled for in the experiment and are 
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assumed to be linearly related to the dependent variables of interest. One can adjust 
for the effects of covariates in data analysis to test treatment effects more sensitively 
(Hair et al. 2010). Thus, the two variables mentioned above were measured and 
tested for potential influences on the analyses of the dependent variables, e.g., 
decision satisfaction. 
The rationale for including involvement as a covariate is that it ultimately influences 
information processing, which refers to how deeply the information offered is pro-
cessed by an individual (Petty, Cacioppo & Schumann 1983; Cacioppo & Petty 
1984). People vary in their motivation, some look at information in detail, others only 
superficially, and it is possible to distinguish situational or enduring motivation, or, in 
other words, involvement (Richins, Bloch & McQuarrie 1992; Richins & Bloch 1986). 
Within the context of this research, especially situational involvement during the 
experiment is of great relevance. When situational involvement is high it will lead 
participants to engage in more detailed trade-offs between alternatives and, thus, 
involvement could have an influence on their motivation to evaluate the alternatives. 
However, in the course of Experiment 1, participants’ motivation should differ 
according to the interaction of accountability and assortment size. Therefore, it is 
important to measure involvement and control for its effects on the dependent 
measures. Otherwise the results could be biased. Situational involvement (also 
called study involvement) was measured using a slightly adapted scale of Miniard el 
at. (1991). The scale consisted of four items and showed a high level of reliability (“I 
was very involved during the course of the study.”, “I was concentrating very hard 
during the course of the study.”, “I was paying a lot of attention during the course of 
the study.”, “I carefully considered the offered information.”; α = .93). 
Self-construal was also included as a potentially relevant covariate. This personal 
trait distinguishes certain people as being more independent and others as more 
interdependent on people in their environment. This trait could influence how strongly 
buyers tried to incorporate preferences of others, especially in the conditions of 
informal accountability. When a person is strongly interdependent, she may try 
harder to please others, even if others do not have legitimate authority over her. It 
seems, therefore, that self-construal is an important covariate that could have influ-
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enced the motivation to engage in detailed trade-offs between the alternatives 
offered.  
To measure self-construal, a shortened form of Singelis’ (1994) scale was adopted. 
Items were selected on the basis of the highest factor loadings (Singelis 1994, 
Sample 1, all loadings above .5). From the original 24 items introduced by Singelis 
(1994), eight items, listed in Tab. 4-3, were used, (four items for the interdependent 
dimension (α = .53) and four items for the independent dimension (α = .67)). 
Surprisingly, reliability, especially for interdependency, was relatively low. 
 
Items for Self-Construal  
Interdependency 
It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group. 
I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in. 
I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than 
my own accomplishments. 
It is important for me to respect decisions made by the group. 
Independency 
I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I’ve just met. 
I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects. 
My personal identity independent of others, is very important to me. 
I value being in good health above everything. 
 
Tab. 4-3: Items for self-construal (reduced version of the scale from Singelis (1994)) 
 
The subsequent analyses showed, however, that none of the covariates had a sig-
nificant influence on the results. They were, therefore, excluded from the analyses. 
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4.3.3.4 Manipulation and Confound Checks 
To ensure that the different forms of accountability were manipulated successfully, 
buyers were asked to rate on a seven-point scale the extent to which they thought 
about the preferences of their boss or the nursing staff when making their purchase 
decisions. Participants were then asked to rate how realistic they perceived the 
situation to be (“The situation described was realistic.”) and whether they had any 
difficulties in imaging themselves in the situation and, thus, whether the descriptions 
were easy to comprehend and aligned to a real-world situation (“I had no difficulty 
imagining myself in the situation.”). This ensured that the two scenarios did not differ 
in terms of how realistic they were perceived. 
An overview of all the measures used in Experiment 1 is provided in Tab. 4-4. 
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Measure 
Number 
of Items Reliability (α) Source 
Dependent Variables    
Decision Satisfaction 5 .75 Heitmann et al. (2007) 
Overload 2 .96 Morales et al. (2005) 
Mediator    
Justifiability 3 .74 Heitmann et al. (2007) 
Covariates    
Situational Involvement 4 .93 Miniard et al. (1991) 
Self-Construal    
Interdependency 4 .53 Singelis (1994) 
Independency 4 .67 Singelis (1994) 
Manipulation Check    
Accountability 1 n.a.  
Confound Checks    
Realism 1 n.a. Dabholkar (1994) 
Comprehensibility 1 n.a. Dabholkar (1994) 
 
Tab. 4-4: Overview of measures for Experiment 1 
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4.3.4 Results 
4.3.4.1 Manipulation and Confound Checks 
A manipulation check was first performed to test whether the two different forms of 
accountability were manipulated successfully. It will be recalled that the manipulation 
check asked participants to rate on a 7-point-scale the extent to which they felt more 
accountable to their boss’ or the nurse’s preference when deciding on trousers to 
purchase. The scale was anchored by “1 = to my boss” and “7 = to the nurses”, 
meaning all values smaller than four show that participants felt more accountable to 
their boss, while all values greater than four reveal they felt more accountable to the 
nurses.  
A significant main effect revealed that participants in the official accountability manip-
ulation felt more accountable to their boss, while those that were manipulated to be 
informally accountable felt more accountable to the preferences of the nurses (Mofficial 
accountability = 3.37, Minformal accountability = 5.10, F(1, 101) = 37.43, p < .001), as would be 
expected. Furthermore, it was tested whether assortment size, the other independent 
variable, had an effect on the manipulation check and/or if the interaction of assort-
ment size and accountability had an effect on the manipulation. Again, as expected, 
neither the main effect of assortment size nor the interaction were significant 
(ps >.81). 
Finally, two univariate ANOVAS were performed to test whether the two scenarios 
differed in terms of their perceived realism. On both items of the realism check, 
accountability and assortment size did not yield any significant effects (ps > .43). 
Thus, participants had no difficulties in imagining the situations described in the 
scenarios and thought both were equally realistic. 
4.3.4.2 Hypotheses Testing 
Interactive Effect of Assortment Size and Accountability. Hypotheses H1A and H1B 
postulated an interactive effect of assortment size and accountability. To test for this 
effect, an ANOVA was conducted. Firstly, the results demonstrate that the main 
effect of assortment size on decision satisfaction was not significant (Msmall = 4.27, 
Mlarge = 4.01, F(1, 99) = 1.10, p > .29), while the form of accountability had a signifi-
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cant main effect on decision satisfaction (Mofficial = 4.46, Minformal = 3.82, 
F(1, 99) = 7.69, p < .01) Secondly, and importantly, the ANOVA revealed that the 
latter effect was qualified by a significant interaction effect between accountability 
and assortment size (F(1, 99) = 9.12, p = .003). Following the logic of hypotheses 
H1A and H1B, a simple effects analysis was conducted to identify which of the con-
ditions differed from one another. This analysis revealed that officially accountable 
decision makers experienced no significant difference in satisfaction between the two 
assortments (Msmall = 4.24, Mlarge = 4.69, F(1, 99) = 1.75, p > .18), as postulated in 
H1A, while informally accountable decision makers were less satisfied with the large 
than with the small assortment (Msmall = 4.30, Mlarge = 3.39, F(1, 99) = 8.87, p < .005), 
as predicted in H1B. In summary, H1A and H1B are clearly supported. The mean 
values for decision satisfaction, as well all other dependent variables, are shown in 
Tab. 4-5, and the results are laid out in Fig. 4-3. 
 
 Official Accountability Informal Accountability 
 
Small 
Assortment 
Large Assort-
ment 
Small 
Assortment 
Large 
Assortment 
Decision Satisfaction 4.24 
(1.31) 
4.69 
(1.30) 
4.3 
(1.03) 
3.39 
(1.08) 
Overload 1.76 
(.74) 
2.66 
(1.46) 
1.58 
(.83) 
2.07 
(1.25) 
Justifiability 5.27 
(1.34) 
5.43 
(1.32) 
5.83 
(.82) 
4.97 
(1.35) 
Manipulation Check 3.41 
(1.50) 
3.32 
(1.55) 
5.13 
(1.26) 
5.07 
(1.47) 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations; all measures were 
taken on seven-point scales such that higher numbers present higher mean 
ratings. 
 
Tab. 4-5: Mean values for the dependent variables in Experiment 1 
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Fig. 4-3: Mean decision satisfaction in Experiment 1 
 
Moderated Mediation. Hypothesis H2 stated that the proven interactive effects of 
accountability and assortment size (H1A and H1B) are mediated by justifiability. In 
other words, a moderated mediation is presumed, in which the interaction of assort-
ment size and accountability unfolds its effect not directly on decision satisfaction, but 
on justifiability, which, in turn, affects decision satisfaction (Preacher, Rucker & 
Hayes 2007, Model 2). In detail, Preacher et al. (2007) state that “these indirect 
effects are hypothesized when theory suggests that [...] a moderation effect is medi-
ated by M (an effect sometimes called mediated moderation, as discussed by Müller 
et al. 2005, among others) […]” (p. 196; see also Müller, Judd & Yzerbyt 2005). This 
describes exactly the effects hypothesized in H1A, H1B and H2, respectively (see 
also Fig. 4-4). From a mathematical perspective, mediated moderation and moder-
ated mediation are calculated precisely the same way since “the model may be used 
to address either hypothesis” (Preacher et al. 2007, p. 196). 
In light of this, and following the approach of Preacher et al. (2007), two multiple 
regression models were run to test the proposed moderated mediation. In the medi-
ator model, the effects of assortment size, accountability and the assortment size x 
accountability interaction on justifiability were examined. This analysis indicated that 
justifiability was predicted by the assortment size x accountability interaction 
(b = .988, t = 2.04, p < .05). In the dependent variable model, decision satisfaction 
3 
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was regressed on justifiability, assortment size, accountability and the assortment 
size x accountability interaction. In this model, justifiability predicted decision 
satisfaction (b = .297, t = 3.34, p < .002). However, the assortment size x account-
ability interaction was still significant (b = 1.065, t = 2.44, p < .02). This shows that 
moderated mediation exists, albeit only partially, the latter indicating that at least one 
other mediator must exist that additionally explains the effect of the assortment size x 
accountability interaction on decision satisfaction (Zhao, Lynch & Chen 2010).  
As expected, the results show that a) the interaction between assortment size and 
accountability determines justifiability and b) justifiability, in turn, affects decision 
satisfaction. Using the recommended bootstrapping technique (5,000 samples), the 
results confirm that the conditional indirect effect of assortment size on decision 
satisfaction through justifiability is significant for informal accountability (b = -.248, 
95 % confidence interval [CI] = [-.501, -.047]), but not for official accountability 
(b = .046, 95 % CI = [-.190, .274]; Zhao et al. 2010). Thus, a partial moderated 
mediation exists, which means that H2 is supported. Although not a necessary 
condition for moderated mediation (see Zhao et al. 2010), in addition decision 
satisfaction was regressed on assortment size, accountability and the assortment 
size x accountability interaction. As would be predicted (see Equation 1 in Müller et 
al. 2005), the assortment size x accountability interaction in this model is significant 
(b = 1.358, t = 3.02, p = .003). In order to prove that the decomposition of the 
originally detected interaction effect of assortment size and accountability was done 
correctly, one can calculate if the product of the b coefficients for the indirect path, 
i.e., the coefficient of the interaction in the mediator model times the coefficient of the 
mediator in the dependent variable model, plus the coefficient of the interaction in the 
dependent variable model equals the coefficient of the interaction in the last regres-
sion of decision satisfaction on assortment size, accountability and the assortment 
size x accountability interaction (Preacher, Curran & Bauer 2006; Aiken & West 
1991). In the case of the analysis at hand this means that  
.9884 * .2971 + 1.0647 ≡ 1.358 
which holds true. Thus, a correct decomposition of the interaction can be shown as 
further proof of the postulated moderated mediation. 
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Notes: X is the independent variable, W is the moderator, XW is the inter-
action of the independent variable and the moderator, M is the mediator, Y 
is the dependent variable. 
 
Fig. 4-4: Moderated mediation (Model 2, slightly adapted from Preacher et al. 2007, 
p. 194) 
 
Further Analysis Regarding Overload. Although not stated as a formal hypothesis, it 
was tested if assortment size, accountability and/or their interaction influenced 
overload. Therefore an ANOVA was conducted.  This analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of assortment size, i.e., as would be expected, the larger assortment led 
to increased overload (Mlarge = 2.36, Msmall = 1.68, F(1, 99) = 10.15, p = .002). 
Furthermore, accountability had a marginal significant effect on overload 
(Mofficial = 2.19, Minformal = 1.84, F(1, 99) = 3.04, p < .09) while the interaction effect 
was not significant (F(1, 99) = .881, p = .35). It is important to note that participants 
under official accountability experienced more overload than informally accountable 
participants. The reasoning behind this is that official accountable participants gener-
ally made greater effort when assessing trade-offs between alternatives and, thus, 
X 
W 
XW 
M 
Y 
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experienced more overload. Informally accountable decision makers, however, did 
not experience as much overload since they were less motivated to evaluate all 
alternatives in detail. Fig. 4-5 shows the corresponding mean values. 
 
 
Fig. 4-5: Mean overload in Experiment 1 
 
4.3.5 Discussion 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to test hypotheses H1A, H1B and H2. As predicted 
by H1A, decision makers under official accountability were equally satisfied when 
choosing from small or large assortments. H1B was also confirmed, with the results 
revealing that decision makers under informal accountability were more satisfied 
when choosing from small than from large assortments. Thus, the proposed interac-
tion between assortment size and accountability was demonstrated. This deepens 
the insights from Polman’s (2012) findings by showing that not all forms of accounta-
bility lead to reduced satisfaction when choosing from large assortments, i.e., 
overchoice effects. Thus, an important boundary condition was revealed. 
In addition to this, the underlying process of how assortment size and accountability 
affect decision satisfaction was investigated. As outlined earlier, the revealed interac-
tion between assortment size and accountability was qualified by mediation: for 
informally accountable decision makers, the effect of assortment size on decision 
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satisfaction worked through an indirect path with justifiability as a mediator. This 
means that decision makers prefer to have a mentally convenient choice when held 
informally accountable and, consequently, appreciate small, rather than large, 
assortments. If, however, decision makers have to make a choice from a large 
assortment, they are not willing to investigate all alternatives in depth and, therefore, 
have the feeling that it is hard to justify their own decision. This, in turn, reduces their 
satisfaction with the decision process. 
As demonstrated by further analysis, participants under official accountability expe-
rienced more overload than those under informal accountability, which means, in 
general, they invested greater effort in trade-offs between alternatives. However, this 
did not lead to them feel unsatisfied with a large assortment due to the ease with 
which they could justify their decision once they had identified the option they wished 
to purchase. In contrast, informally accountable decision makers did not experience 
as much overload since they were less motivated to evaluate all offered alternatives 
in detail. This reduced the possibility of justifying their decision when choosing from a 
large assortment, through giving good reasons for their choice, because they felt they 
did not make comprehensive trade-offs between a sufficient number of alternatives. 
As explained before, this ultimately reduced their decision satisfaction. 
The fundamental psychological processes that lead to reduced decision satisfaction 
when choosing from a large assortment and, simultaneously, being held informally 
accountable is now very clear. Building on this, what is of great interest is how the 
satisfaction of decision makers under these circumstances can be enhanced. As 
already outlined, this could potentially be achieved by using attribute-level color-
coding, the application of which can be seen in van Herpen and Pieters’ (2007) 
study. Experiment 2 will, therefore, investigate the effects of color-coding when 
choosing from large assortments under different forms of accountability. 
67 
4.4 Experiment 2: Joint Effects of Color-Coding and 
Accountability in a B2B Setting 
4.4.1 Design, Participants and Procedure 
Experiment 2 used a 2 (color-coding: yes versus no) x 2 (accountability: informal 
versus official) between-subjects design. The same subjects from Experiment 1 were 
used and the order of the two studies was counterbalanced among participants. A 
total of 103 buyers from German hospitals participated in the study. However, since 
color-coding was implemented in this study, it was important that participants were 
not color-blind. Therefore one participant had to be removed from the analysis. The 
remaining sample consisted of a total of 102 buyers. Of the participants, 70 (68.6 %) 
were male and 32 (31.4 %) were female. 83 (81.4 %) of the buyers had managerial 
responsibility, while 15 (14.7 %) did not and 4 (3.9 %) did not specify when answer-
ing the question. The average age of the participants was 45.3 years. Most of the 
buyers (95; 93.1 %) were employed full-time, while 7 (6.9 %) worked part-time. On 
average, they had been in their current job position for 10.3 years and had generally 
worked as buyers for 15.3 years. Exactly half (51) of the hospitals for which the 
buyers worked were run by NGOs while 37 (36.3 %) were public hospitals and 14 
(13.7 %) were commercially run. The average number of beds per hospital was 562. 
The experiment was carried out as follows. It began with buyers being told that they 
had to buy new surgical suture material for their hospital. As already explained, they 
were randomly assigned to a scenario with either informal or official accountability. It 
will be recalled that the accountability manipulation was held constant over Experi-
ments 1 and 2 to prevent confounding effects between the two studies arising from 
different accountability manipulations. Since the order of the studies was counter-
balanced, participants were either randomly assigned to an accountability manipula-
tion in Experiment 1 or in Experiment 2, depending on the specific study order. Par-
ticipants in the official accountability condition were told that they had to justify their 
decision to their boss, while informally accountable subjects were told that they 
could, but did not have to, incorporate the preferences of a surgeon who would be 
using the suture material they bought. Afterwards, buyers were shown large assort-
ments that had either a color-coding on attribute-level for the kinds of product appli-
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cations or did not have any additional coding. Buyers then had to choose one of the 
products from the assortment they were presented with. Having made their choice, 
participants rated their decision satisfaction and filled out a series of covariates, 
confound and manipulation checks. Participants took on average 13:01 minutes to 
complete the experiment. 
4.4.2 Manipulation of Independent Variables 
Two different scenarios to manipulate the form of accountability were created. Firstly, 
to manipulate the form of accountability (informal versus official accountability), 
buyers were confronted with a scenario and, secondly, they were shown either a 
color-coded or non-coded assortment from which they had to choose a product. 
4.4.2.1 Manipulation of Accountability 
Pre-study. To ensure that the scenarios experienced were as realistic as possible, a 
total of 16 expert interviews with buyers in German hospitals were conducted before-
hand. Buyers were asked, among other things, to describe typical purchase pro-
cesses for surgical suture materials. In detail, they were asked who would first signal 
the need to make a purchase, which departments would typically be involved in such 
a decision and which standards and rules they would have to follow. They were also 
explicitly asked about the different people involved – the equivalent of roles in a 
buying center – and hierarchical structures that are relevant for purchase decisions 
for surgical suture material. In addition, information was sought on their experiences 
of assortment size and presentation of the suppliers that they typically purchased 
such materials from. Where possible, the interviews were recorded digitally7, which 
was the case for eleven interviews, lasting an average of 30:44 minutes. All inter-
views were conducted in person at the facilities of the participating hospital.  
Formalization of the processes differed considerably among the hospitals and, 
importantly, hospitals also varied with regards to the inclusion of user preferences 
when new products had to be purchased. While five experts told to buy solely what 
the user, i.e., surgeons, wanted, nine buyers explained that although they made the 
                                            
7
 Buyers were asked for their permission to record the interview with a digital recorder. Some buyers, 
however, could not give this permission due to regulations of their employer. 
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final purchase decision themselves, they incorporated user preferences. In contrast, 
two buyers stated it was solely their decision which products they bought, they did 
not ask users about their preferences. Importantly, many buyers mentioned that the 
degree to which user preferences are incorporated into purchase decisions varies 
widely among hospitals and, thus, they were at least partly sensitive to different 
forms of accountability in practice. All buyers mentioned in some way that they have 
a boss to whom they felt accountable and who would, at least occasionally, evaluate 
their decisions. In summary, it appears realistic to have a scenario with an informal 
accountability manipulation in which non-binding user preferences are mentioned 
and another scenario where buyers are solely accountable to their bosses (official 
accountability). 
Buyers’ satisfaction with the assortment size and presentation of current suppliers of 
surgical suture material differed. Ten buyers thought that assortments of most sup-
pliers were well presented and easy to comprehend, fourteen of the buyers were 
totally satisfied with their current supplier and two only had minor complaints regard-
ing satisfaction. In contrast, four buyers had difficulties finding the right product from 
the actual assortments, indeed two always contacted the sales personnel of the 
corresponding supplier directly because they felt unable to make a decision from the 
assortments offered on their own. It is important to note that this satisfaction is based 
on a perception of the product quality the suppliers deliver and not their decision 
satisfaction, as measured in the dissertation’s three experiments. Decision satisfac-
tion, however, is reflected in the statements on assortment presentation, with buyers 
who felt overwhelmed by the number of options offered being not totally satisfied with 
the corresponding suppliers’ assortments. 
Manipulation of Accountability in the Experiment. Similar to Experiment 1, accounta-
bility was manipulated through different scenarios which explained to whom the 
buyer should feel accountable to and whether this person had a legitimate authority 
over them. In case of the official accountability manipulation, participants again were 
told that their decision would be evaluated by their boss. In the scenario for informally 
accountable buyers the boss was not mentioned. They were just informed that a 
specific surgeon using suture material has certain preferences that the buyer could, 
but did not have to, incorporate into his or her decision. Thus, accountability was 
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again manipulated by a) varying the hierarchical status of the person the buyer 
should feel accountable to and, consequently, b) varying whether or not there was 
legitimate authority over the buyer. All other descriptions were kept as consistent as 
possible. For example, the situation described in the scenarios explained which 
product specifications a buyer had to search for and these descriptions were the 
same for both accountability manipulations. To make the situation as realistic as 
possible, buyers were again informed to know certain basic characteristics of the 
purchase situation, drawing on their own experience, while either the boss or sur-
geon developed more detailed preferences and specifications.  
The exact manipulations were as follows: 
 
Official accountability: Imagine the following situation: Recently, one of your 
suppliers for surgical suture material had problems delivering the materials 
ordered. Therefore, you have to conduct a purchase from a supplier you 
have not ordered from in the past. What you need at the moment is a surgical 
suture material for use in gynecologic surgery. From your experience with 
past purchases you already know the following: The material has to be 
explicitly denoted for use in gynecological surgery and the price per packag-
ing unit should be as low as possible. Furthermore, your boss tells you that 
the material needs to be absorbable. Absorption should ideally take place 
within 75 days, but up to 90 days would be acceptable. It should be a multi-
filament material that is uncolored. Desirable, but not compulsory, is a further 
applicability of the material for subcutaneous skin closure. Since the pur-
chase is important for the hospital, your boss will evaluate your purchase 
decision in considerable detail. 
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Informal accountability: Imagine the following situation: Recently, one of your 
suppliers for surgical suture material had problems delivering the materials 
ordered. Therefore, you have to conduct a purchase from a supplier you 
have not ordered from in the past. What you need at the moment is a surgical 
suture material for use in gynecologic surgery. From your experience with 
past purchases you already know the following: The material has to be 
explicitly denoted for use in gynecological surgery and the price per pack-
aging unit should be as low as possible. Furthermore, you come to talk to 
one of the surgeons and he tells you that the material needs to be absorb-
able. Absorption should ideally take place within 75 days, but up to 90 days 
would be acceptable. It should be a multifilament material that is uncolored. 
Desirable, but not compulsory, is a further applicability of the material for 
subcutaneous skin closure. Because you think that the needs of the surgeon 
are reasonable, you promise him that you will incorporate them if possible. 
 
4.4.2.2 Manipulation of Assortment Presentation 
After reading the scenario containing the accountability manipulation, participants 
were presented with an assortment of surgical suture materials from which they had 
to choose one. The assortment consisted of thirteen different materials, which is 
considered to be a large assortment on the basis of the expert interviews conducted 
beforehand and the assortments offered by leading suppliers.8 The descriptions of 
the stimuli, i.e., the surgical suture materials, were displayed in a table showing the 
following dimensions: name, material, applications, color of material, absorption, 
structure, price per packaging unit (36 pieces). For the attribute-level color-coding, a 
column showing the corresponding colors for the fields of application was added. 
Examples of the stimuli are shown in Tab. 4-6 and the complete stimuli can be found 
in Appendix 2. As can be seen again, this assortment was an alignable or 
noncomplementary one, respectively, as was the case in Experiment 1.  
 
                                            
8
 The assortment was also critically evaluated regarding its realism by one buyer from a hospital who 
participated in the expert interviews. 
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Fields of 
appli-
cation Name 
Mate-
rial 
Appli-
cations 
Color of 
Material 
Absorp-
tion 
Struc-
ture 
Price 
in € (36 
pieces) 
••• 
Lactil 
910 
Poly-
glactin 
910 
 
gynecology 
skin closure 
(sub-
cutaneous, 
intra-
cutaneous) 
 
 
un-
colored 
violet 
approx. 
56 – 70 
days 
multi-
filament 
125.00 
•• 
Novo 
Med 
90 
Poly-
ester 
(PET) 
 
cardio-
surgery 
vascular 
surgery 
white 
green 
none 
multi-
filament 
68.00 
 
Tab. 4-6: Example of color-coded stimuli in Experiment 2 
 
The legend explaining the color representing each application was listed on the same 
page. For example, orange stood for possible application in gynecology and red 
indicated possible application for intracutaneous skin closure. Thus, participants in 
the color-coding condition just had to remember the corresponding colors for the 
applications they were looking for to find materials that would meet the particular 
demands of the scenario.  
4.4.3 Selection of Measures 
4.4.3.1 Dependent Measures 
The dependent measure of interest in this experiment was decision satisfaction. It 
was measured with the same five items from Heitmann et al. (2007) as used in 
Experiment 1 (e.g., “I was satisfied with my experience of deciding which product 
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option to choose.”). As with the previous experiment, the scale produced a satisfac-
tory level of reliability (α = .69). 
4.4.3.2 Covariates 
As in Experiment 1, a number of covariates were included in this study to control for 
external influences and to test treatment effects more sensitively. Covariates were 
the same as in the first study, namely, situational involvement and self-construal. 
Self-construal is independent of the study treatment at hand and since Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2 were conducted together, self-construal was only measured once, 
but included in both the analyses for Experiment 1 and 2. Situational involvement 
could, however, have differed over the course of the two studies and was thus meas-
ured twice. Involvement was again measured on a four-item scale from Miniard et al. 
(1991). The scale continued to show a highly satisfactory level of reliability (α = .92). 
The subsequent analyses, however, revealed that none of the covariates had a sig-
nificant influence on the results and, for this reason, they were excluded from the 
analyses. 
4.4.3.3 Manipulation and Confound Checks 
Similar to Experiment 1, and to ensure that the different forms of accountability were 
manipulated successfully, buyers were asked to rate on a seven-point scale if they 
thought about the preferences of their boss or the surgeon when making their pur-
chase decisions. Based on two items from Dabholkar (1994), participants were then 
asked, as in Experiment 1, to rate how realistic they perceived the situation to be 
(“The situation described was realistic.”) and if they had any difficulties in imagining 
themselves in the situation (“I had no difficulty imagining myself in the situation.”). 
This ensured that the two different scenarios used to manipulate accountability did 
not differ in how realistically they were perceived. Tab. 4-7 gives an overview of all 
measures used in Experiment 2. 
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Measure 
Number 
of Items Reliability (α) Source 
Dependent Variables    
Decision Satisfaction 5 .69 Heitmann et al. (2007) 
Covariates    
Situational Involvement 4 .92 Miniard et al. (1991) 
Self-Construal*    
Interdependency 4 .53 Singelis (1994) 
Independency 4 .67 Singelis (1994) 
Manipulation Check    
Accountability 1 n.a.  
Confound Checks    
Realism 1 n.a. Dabholkar (1994) 
Comprehensibility 1 n.a. Dabholkar (1994) 
 
Notes: * Values of self-construal are the same as in Experiment 1 because this 
construct was only measured once. 
 
Tab. 4-7: Overview of measures for Experiment 2 
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4.4.4 Results 
4.4.4.1 Manipulation and Confound Checks 
First, a manipulation check was performed to test whether the two different forms of 
accountability were manipulated successfully. Similar to Experiment 1, the manipula-
tion check asked participants to rate on a 7-point-scale whether they felt more 
accountable to their boss’ or the surgeon’s preferences when choosing a surgical 
suture material. The scale was anchored by “1 = to my boss” and “7 = to the sur-
geon”, meaning all values smaller than four show that participants felt more account-
able to their boss while all values greater than four mean that they felt more account-
able to the surgeon. A significant main effect revealed that participants in the official 
accountability manipulation felt more accountable to their boss, while participants 
manipulated to be informally accountable felt greater accountability to the surgeon’s 
preferences (Mofficial accountability = 3.62, Minformal accountability = 5.28, F(1, 100 = 36.34, 
p < .001). Furthermore it was tested, if assortment presentation, i.e, the other inde-
pendent variable, had an effect on the manipulation check and/or if the interaction of 
assortment presentation and accountability had an effect. As expected, neither the 
main effect of assortment size nor the interaction was significant (ps > .53). 
Additionally, two univariate ANOVAS were performed to test whether the two sce-
narios differed in how realistically they were perceived. Accountability and assort-
ment presentation did not yield any significant effects on either items of the realism 
check (ps > .21). Thus, participants had no difficulty imagining the situations 
described in the scenarios and thought both were equally realistic. 
4.4.4.2 Hypotheses Testing 
Interactive Effect of Assortment Presentation and Accountability. Hypotheses H3 and 
H4 postulated an interactive effect of assortment presentation and accountability. To 
test for this effect, an ANOVA was conducted. Firstly, the results demonstrate that 
the main effect of assortment presentation on decision satisfaction was marginally 
significant (Mno color-coding = 4.44, Mcolor-coding = 4.78, F(1, 98) = 3.65, p < .06) and the 
form of accountability had a significant main effect on decision satisfaction 
(Mofficial = 4.40, Minformal = 4.84, F(1, 98) = 5.40, p < .03). The ANOVA further revealed 
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a non-significant interaction effect between accountability and assortment presen-
tation (F(1, 98) = 1.64, p < .21). However, a simple effects analysis was conducted to 
see if some of the conditions differed significantly from one another, albeit the non-
significant interaction effect. This analysis revealed that officially accountable deci-
sion makers experienced no difference in decision satisfaction across the two forms 
of assortment presentation (Mno color-coding = 4.33, Mcolor-coding = 4.46, F(1, 98) = .11, 
p > .74), as was posited in H3. However, informally accountable decision makers, as 
predicted in H4, were less satisfied with the assortment presentation without color-
coding than with the one with color-coding (Mno color-coding = 4.54, Mcolor-coding = 5.17, 
F(1, 98) = 4.72, p < .04).  
It is important to note that a significant interaction effect is not a compulsory require-
ment to test simple effects. When there are explicit hypotheses about the direction of 
effects and which of the contrasts should be significant, simple effects analysis can 
be performed without testing for interaction beforehand (Keselman et al. 1998). Since 
corresponding directional hypotheses were stated from the outset of this dissertation, 
it is sufficient to show that simple effects revealed a significant difference regarding 
informally accountable decision makers, while effects were clearly not significant for 
officially accountable decision makers, as postulated beforehand. Summing up, the 
simple effects analysis shows strong support for H3 and H4, although the interaction 
effect in the ANOVA is not significant. In other words, H3 and H4 can be seen as 
supported. The mean values for the dependent variables are shown in Tab. 4-8 and 
the results are recorded in Fig. 4-6. 
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 Official Accountability Informal Accountability 
 
No Color-
Coding 
Color-Cod-
ing 
No Color-
Coding 
Color-
Coding 
Decision Satisfaction 4.33 
(.92) 
4.46 
(1.18) 
4.54 
(.81) 
5.17 
(1.00) 
Manipulation Check 3.71 
(1.37) 
3.54 
(1.75) 
5.19 
(1.17) 
5.38 
(1.21) 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations; all measures were 
taken on seven-point scales such that higher numbers present higher mean 
ratings. 
Tab. 4-8: Mean values for the dependent variables in Experiment 2 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4-6: Mean decision satisfaction in Experiment 2 
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4.4.5 Discussion 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to test hypotheses H3 and H4, thereby 
demonstrating color-coding to be a promising means of enhancing decision satisfac-
tion of informally accountable decision makers. Ultimately, both hypotheses were 
confirmed, and thus, as predicted, color-coding has been shown as helpful for infor-
mally, but not officially, accountable decision makers. As explained in Experiment 1, 
officially accountable decision makers are far more motivated to process and eval-
uate assortments, even if they are large and/or complex. Since the basic information 
about the products is held constant with or without such presentation aids, these 
decision makers do not benefit strongly from color-coding or other forms of mentally 
convenient assortment presentation. Informally accountable decision makers, how-
ever, are less motivated to deeply evaluate all alternatives offered, it is helpful for 
them, when assortment presentation makes it easy or, in other words, mentally 
convenient to identify which products are and which are not worth to form detailed 
trade-offs. Importantly, Experiment 2 clearly showed that color-coding did not harm 
satisfaction of the officially accountable decision makers and can, therefore, be 
applied without concern. 
Thus far the experiments conducted have only compared situations where decision 
makers were held accountable in some form. This is reasonable since B2B buyers, in 
reality, are always held accountable for their decisions, making it unrealistic to 
encourage them to envisage a situation of zero accountability when performing their 
job. However, with regard to Experiment 2, it is important to compare decision 
makers not accountable for their decision to those who are accountable in order to 
observe whether, and if so, how, they differ in their decision satisfaction. Building on 
this, the results of Experiment 2 were replicated and extended in Experiment 3.9 In 
detail, the third experiment was conducted to extend the result of Experiment 2 in two 
important ways: Firstly, and as already discussed, accountable and non-accountable 
decision makers were compared on the basis of decision satisfaction. Secondly, 
Experiment 3 used a service, instead of a product, offer and adopted a 
complementary, rather than non-complementary, assortment. 
                                            
9
 Given that overchoice effects have been heavily studied in the case of non-accountable decision 
makers, a similar replication is unnecessary for Experiment 1. 
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4.5 Experiment 3: Joint Effects of Color-Coding and 
Accountability in a B2C Setting 
4.5.1 Design, Participants and Procedure 
Experiment 3 used a 2 (color-coding: yes versus no) x 3 (accountability: none versus 
informal versus official) between-subjects design. A total of 241 people participated in 
this online experiment. Of the participants, 124 (51.5 %) were male and 117 (48.5 %) 
were female. Of the participants, 95 (39.4 %) worked in a permanent position, 69 
(28.6 %) had a temporary job, 47 (19.5 %) were unemployed and 30 (12.4 %) had 
never worked before. The average age of the participants was 29.7 years. As an 
incentive, several Amazon vouchers were raffled off among participants.  
Importantly, this was a random online sample, which did not consist of B2B decision 
makers, meaning accountability was transferred to another context. As will be 
explained, the fictitious decision situation used in the scenarios is, however, similar to 
a B2B setting. Thus, the results can still be applied to B2B decision makers, 
because, as former research has shown, experts like B2B buyers outperform ama-
teurs in the speed at which they reach an accurate decision, but amateurs often 
show the same patterns in their decision making (Neale & Northcraft 1986). Since 
this dissertation is interested in revealing effects on decision satisfaction, rather than 
decision speed, or even the accuracy of a decision, it is not a major limitation to use 
a non-B2B sample, especially because Experiment 3 is a replication of Experiment 2 
in some important parts. In further support of this approach, studies with student 
samples have been used to explain behavior in B2B contexts in earlier research (for 
example, Wilken et al. 2010; Camerer 2003). Also Herbst and Schwarz (2011) 
showed that samples with trained students are not significantly outperformed by 
professionals in a large number of studies. Because the focal decision for Experiment 
3 of this dissertation is one for a restaurant, it can be assumed that special training is 
not necessary to reach a similar performance. Equally relevant is that the sample 
selected in this dissertation is more general than a student sample and since 
Experiment 3 is in part a replication of Experiment 2, which used a B2B sample, 
there should be no serious issues concerning the choice of participants for this study. 
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The procedure of the experiment was as follows. Participants were asked to imagine 
that they had to choose a restaurant to celebrate a certain event. Those participants 
held unaccountable for their decision were told to choose a restaurant according to 
their own preferences. Informally accountable decision makers, on the other hand, 
were informed that their colleagues would take part in the event and that they wanted 
to incorporate their colleagues’ preferences into the decision so their colleagues 
would like the chosen restaurant. Officially accountable participants were told that 
their boss along with several key accounts of the company would attend the event 
and it was very important to make the right decision based on those customers’ 
preferences, indeed their boss would critically evaluate their decision afterwards. 
After reading the scenario with the accountability manipulation, participants had to 
choose a restaurant from a restaurant guide. This guide either used a color-coding 
on attribute-level additionally to descriptions of the restaurants or just showed the 
descriptions. After their choice, participants rated their decision satisfaction. They 
also completed a series of covariates, confound and manipulation checks. Partici-
pants took on average 15:11 minutes to complete the experiment. 
4.5.2 Manipulation of Independent Variables 
4.5.2.1 Manipulation of Accountability 
Similar to Experiments 1 and 2, accountability was manipulated using different sce-
narios, which explained to whom the buyer should feel accountable to and whether 
this person had legitimate authority over them. In detail, participants were asked to 
plan a certain event. In the case of the official accountability manipulation, partici-
pants were again told that their boss would evaluate their decision. For informally and 
non-accountable decision makers the boss was not mentioned. The scenario stated 
that the decision maker knew certain preferences of his or her colleagues that he or 
she wanted to incorporate these into the decision to ensure their colleagues were 
comfortable with the restaurant choice. Thus, the two distinct forms of accountability 
were manipulated once again by a) varying the hierarchical status of the person the 
decision maker should feel accountable to and, consequently, b) varying whether or 
not legitimate authority over the decision maker was present. All other descriptions, 
for example, the preferences of others described in the scenarios, were kept as 
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consistent as possible. The non-accountable decision makers, however, were told to 
simply decide on the basis of their own preferences. Since those preferences were 
not known to the researcher, there were no statements what these preferences had 
to look like to keep the situation as realistic as possible. Preferences of other people 
were not mentioned. The exact manipulations were as follows: 
 
Official accountability: Imagine that you are asked to organize an event for 
your company’s 10th anniversary. In detail, you have to choose a restaurant 
for a dinner with 20 key customers of your company. Since this event is very 
important for your boss, he will evaluate your decision for a restaurant in 
great detail. 
 
Informal accountability: Imagine that you are asked to organize an event for 
your company’s 10th anniversary. In detail, you have to choose a restaurant 
for a dinner with 20 of your colleagues. Since you want your colleagues to 
feel comfortable, you want to choose a restaurant that they like. 
 
No accountability: Imagine that you want to organize an event for your 10th 
anniversary at your company. In detail, you want to choose a restaurant for a 
dinner with 20 of your colleagues. You are really looking forward to that event 
and now want to choose a restaurant that best fits your preferences. 
 
In the first two conditions, participants were further informed about some preferences 
of their customers or colleagues, e.g., that lots of them prefer wine and would appre-
ciate a restaurant near the city center. 
4.5.2.2 Manipulation of Assortment Presentation 
After reading one of the scenarios with the accountability manipulation, participants 
were shown a restaurant guide with descriptions and pictures of eight different res-
taurants. The complete stimuli can be found in Appendix 3. 
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As an example, one of the restaurant descriptions reads: 
 
Asia Royal: When visiting us, you will experience a culinary explosion: The 
inimitable art of Sushi making and Asian-style high quality specialties with 
fish, meat or vegetables. Relax in a stylish lounge-like atmosphere and enjoy 
one of our world-famous cocktails… Take some time to relax in our “Asia 
Garden” – a unique terrace, designed in the spirit of feng shui. A place of 
silence, all calm and peaceful while located in the middle of the lively city 
center. We are sure here you’ll find calmness and inner peace! Asia Royal, 
the unique spirit! 
 
The restaurant guide with color-coding used colored symbols for specific attributes of 
the restaurants, e.g., if a certain restaurant was located near the city center or served 
fish. Participants who saw the restaurant guide with color-coding could, therefore, 
easily recognize the alternatives that were potentially fitting the preferences they 
wanted to incorporate into their decision and had a reduced set of options to trade-
off. The symbols for the specific color-coding applied in this study are shown in Fig. 
4-7. Importantly, in this experiment a complementary assortment was used because 
the chosen attributes and their combinations, respectively, were independent of each 
other. Thus, participants had to trade-off attribute combinations against one another, 
but not all attributes were present for all restaurants, making the decision situation 
more demanding than in Experiment 1 and 2. 
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Fig. 4-7: Color-coded symbols used in Experiment 3 
 
4.5.3 Selection of Measures 
4.5.3.1 Dependent Measures 
As with the previous two experiments, the dependent measure of interest was deci-
sion satisfaction. Decision satisfaction was measured using the same five items from 
Heitmann et al. (2007) as in Experiments 1 and 2 (e.g., “Several good options were 
available for me to choose between.”). Once again, the scale showed a satisfactory 
level of reliability (α = .72). 
4.5.3.2 Covariates 
In addition to some others, the same covariates as in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
were measured in this study. Situational involvement was measured with the same 
four items from Miniard el at. (1991). The scale showed a very good level of reliability 
(α = .82). Self-construal was measured with the same eight items from the preceding 
experiments that constituted a reduced version of the scale from Singelis (1994). The 
four items reflecting interdependency demonstrated an acceptable level of reliability 
Meat Specialties 
 
Located near the City Center 
   
Vegetarian Dishes 
 
Wine Specialties 
 
Fish Specialties 
 
Terrace 
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(α = .59), while the four items for independency showed a relatively low level of 
reliability (α = .53).  
For Experiment 3, enduring involvement was included as a possible covariate. The 
rationale behind this was that some of the participants frequently ate in restaurants 
and may like to go out for dinner as a hobby, with the result that enduring involve-
ment for restaurants potentially varied across participants, influencing how motivated 
they were to process the information offered in the restaurant guide (Richins et al. 
1992; Richins & Bloch 1986; Cacioppo & Petty 1984). Enduring involvement was 
measured on a three-item scale from Broderick and Mueller (1999). The items read “I 
attach great importance to eating in restaurants.”, “I have a strong interest in eating in 
restaurants.” and “I enjoy eating in restaurants.”. The last item was slightly adapted to 
the context at hand. The scale showed a very good level of reliability (α = .88). 
However, subsequent analyses showed that none of the covariates influenced the 
results. They were therefore excluded from the analyses. 
4.5.3.3 Manipulation and Confound Checks 
To test whether the manipulation of accountability affected who participants felt 
accountable to during their decision for a restaurant, they were asked to rate the fol-
lowing three items on a seven-point scale: “During the course of the study, I thought 
about my boss and that I would have to justify my decision to him.”, “During the 
course of the study, I thought about my colleagues and that I want them to feel com-
fortable at the event.”, “During the course of the study I thought about my own pref-
erences regarding the organization of the event.”.  
Furthermore, participants responded to the same realism check of the scenarios from 
Dabholkar (1994) as already in the preceding two experiments. All measures are 
listed in Tab. 4-9. 
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Measure 
Number 
of Items Reliability (α) Source 
Dependent Variables    
Decision Satisfaction 5 .72 Heitmann et al. (2007) 
Covariates    
Situational Involvement 4 .82 Miniard et al. (1991) 
Self-Construal    
Interdependency 4 .59 Singelis (1994) 
Independency 4 .53 Singelis (1994) 
Manipulation Check    
Accountability    
Boss 1 n.a.  
Colleagues 1 n.a.  
Own Preferences 1 n.a.  
Confound Checks    
Realism 1 n.a. Dabholkar (1994) 
Comprehensibility 1 n.a. Dabholkar (1994) 
 
Tab. 4-9: Overview of measures for Experiment 3 
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4.5.4 Results 
4.5.4.1 Manipulation and Confound Checks 
To test if the manipulation of the different forms of accountability was successful, 
three ANOVAS were performed, i.e., one for each item (e.g., “During the course of 
the study, I thought about my boss and that I would have to justify my decision to 
him.”). Firstly, an ANOVA was conducted to see if participants in the different 
accountability conditions rated differently in how far they felt accountable to their 
boss. The analysis yielded a significant main effect of accountability on this manipu-
lation check (Mofficial = 3.62, Minformal = 3.10, Mnon-accountable = 2.88, F(2, 235) = 3.66, 
p < .03). Next, post-hoc tests were conducted to see which conditions differed exactly 
from one another. These tests revealed that officially accountable participants dif-
fered marginally significant from informally accountable ones (p < .09) and signifi-
cantly from non-accountable subjects (p < .02), while informally accountable subjects 
did not differ from those who were not accountable (p > .45), as would be expected. It 
is not surprising that both forms of accountability differed only on a marginally signifi-
cant level, as both groups thought they had to incorporate preferences of others 
belonging to their working environment. Since the boss was not explicitly mentioned 
in the scenario for informal accountability, some of the participants may have thought 
that their boss, not just their colleagues, was going to be part of the event. It was 
further tested whether assortment presentation or the interaction of assortment 
presentation had an unintended influence on the first manipulation check. Consistent 
with expectations, these effects were not significant (ps > .27). 
A second ANOVA was carried out to see if the groups differed in incorporating their 
colleagues’ preferences into their decision. Again, the analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of accountability (Mofficial = 5.22, Minformal = 5.87, Mnon-accountable = 4.64, 
F(2, 235) = 63.96, p < .001). Again, post-hoc tests were conducted which revealed 
that informally accountable participants differed significantly from officially accounta-
ble ones (p < .02) and from non-accountable ones (p < .001). In addition, officially 
and non-accountable subjects differed significantly (p < .001), which is, most likely, 
due to officially accountable subjects generally incorporating the preferences of 
others into their decision, whereas non-accountable subjects did not. It was again 
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tested whether assortment presentation or the interaction of assortment presentation 
and accountability had an unintended influence on the manipulation check. As one 
would expect, these effects were not significant (ps > .53). 
Lastly, an ANOVA was conducted to see if participants differed regarding how much 
they incorporated their own preferences into the decision for a restaurant depending 
on the accountability manipulation. A significant main effect of accountability on this 
third manipulation was found (Mofficial = 4.63, Minformal = 4.21, Mnon-accountable = 5.14, 
F(2, 235) = 4.80, p < .01). Post-hoc tests showed that participants that were not 
accountable differed marginally significant from those who were officially accountable 
(p < .09) and significantly from those who were informally accountable (p = .002). 
Officially and informally accountable subjects did not differ regarding this manipula-
tion check (p > .15). That only a marginally significant difference between officially 
and non-accountable subjects was found is not completely surprising though, 
because all subjects had probably incorporated their own preferences into the deci-
sion for a restaurant to a certain extent. Since all main effects and the most important 
post-hoc tests showed the expected patterns regarding significant differences 
between the groups, it can be concluded that, in sum, the manipulation of accounta-
bility was successful. 
In addition, two univariate ANOVAS were performed to test whether the three sce-
narios differed regarding the questions on their realism. On both items of the realism 
check accountability and assortment presentation did not yield any significant effects 
(ps > .12). Thus, participants had no difficulties in imagining the situations described 
in the scenarios and thought both were equally realistic. 
4.5.4.2 Hypotheses Testing 
Interactive Effect of Assortment Presentation and Accountability. Hypotheses H3, H4 
and H5 postulated an interactive effect of assortment presentation and accountability. 
To test for this effect, an ANOVA was conducted. Firstly, the results demonstrate that 
the main effect of assortment presentation on decision satisfaction was significant 
(Mno color-coding = 4.98, Mcolor-coding = 4.68, F(1, 198) = 4.77, p = .03). Accountability also 
had a significant main effect on decision satisfaction (Mofficial = 4.34, Minformal = 4.62, 
Mnon-accountable = 5.44, F(2, 198) = 23.56, p < .001). Second, the ANOVA revealed that 
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these main effects were qualified by a marginally significant interaction effect 
between accountability and assortment presentation (F(2, 198) = 2.91, p < .06). To 
test in greater detail whether an interaction effect exists, simple effect analyses were 
conducted. These analyses revealed that officially accountable decision makers 
experienced no difference in decision satisfaction between the two forms of assort-
ment presentation (Mno color-coding = 4.39, Mcolor-coding = 4.29, F(1, 198) = .17, p > .68), as 
was postulated in H3. However, informally accountable decision makers, as pre-
dicted in H4, were less satisfied with the assortment presentation without color-
coding than with the assortment presentation using color-coding (Mno color-coding = 4.28, 
Mcolor-coding = 5.00, F(1, 198) = 9.78, p = .002). As postulated in H5, non-accountable 
decision makers experienced no difference in decision satisfaction between the two 
forms of assortments presentation (Mno color-coding = 5.30, Mcolor-coding = 5.58, 
F(1, 198) = 1.47, p > .23).  To sum up, the simple effect analyses show strong sup-
port for H3, H4 and H5. All mean values are shown in Tab. 4-10. The results are also 
depicted in Fig. 4-8. 
 
 
Fig. 4-8: Mean decision satisfaction in Experiment 3 
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Official Accounta-
bility 
Informal Accounta-
bility 
Non-Accountable 
 
No Color-
Coding 
Color-
Coding 
No Color-
Coding 
Color-
Coding 
No Color-
Coding 
Color-
Coding 
Decision 
Satisfaction 
4.39 
(1.28) 
4.29 
(1.11) 
4.28 
(.86) 
5.00 
(.98) 
5.30 
(.84) 
5.58 
(.71) 
Manipulation 
Check 
      
Boss 3.88 
(2.25) 
3.43 
(2.05) 
3.22 
(1.95) 
2.94 
(1.56) 
2.93 
(1.69) 
2.84 
(1.54) 
Colleagues 5.16 
(1.81) 
5.26 
(1.88) 
6.00 
(1.19) 
5.69 
(1.53) 
2.83 
(1.82) 
3.12 
(1.85) 
Own Prefer-
ences 
4.50 
(1.97) 
4.72 
(2.10) 
4.09 
(1.88) 
4.38 
(2.16) 
4.95 
(1.61) 
5.33 
(1.46) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations; all measures were 
taken on seven-point scales such that higher numbers present higher mean 
ratings. 
 
Tab. 4-10: Mean values for the dependent variables in Experiment 3 
 
Further Analysis of the Different Forms of Accountability. A post-hoc test was con-
ducted, to see if non-accountable decision makers differed from those officially 
accountable because both groups showed the same pattern of results regarding the 
interaction of assortment presentation and accountability. The test showed that non-
accountable decision makers differed significantly from officially accountable ones 
(p < .001) and from informally accountable decision makers (p < .001). Despite 
showing the same pattern, then, decision satisfaction of unaccountable and officially 
accountable decision makers operate at different levels. 
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4.5.5 Discussion 
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to a) replicate the findings of Experiment 2 con-
cerning the interactive effects of assortment presentation and accountability (H3 and 
H4) in a setting where a service, instead of a product, had to be chosen and b) repli-
cate the findings with a different sample. In addition, the results of Experiment 2 were 
extended by introducing a manipulation for non-accountable decision makers (H5) 
into the scenarios. Experiment 3 continued to demonstrate that the decision satisfac-
tion of informally accountable decision makers was improved by color-coding when 
choosing from a large set of options. Unaccountable decision makers and those held 
officially accountable did, as expected, not experience a difference in decision satis-
faction due to the form of assortment presentation, i.e., if the offered options were 
color-coded or not. What this means, though, is that color-coding did not harm the 
satisfaction of these decision makers and, therefore, is a promising means to 
enhancing overall decision satisfaction. 
Given that the results from Experiment 2 could be replicated with another sample, as 
well as in a setting where a service had to be chosen, they appear very robust.  
Further, it could be shown that unaccountable decision makers react differently than 
those subject to informal accountability. Indeed, they revealed the same pattern of 
results as officially accountable decision makers with regard to the non-significant 
effects of color-coding on decision satisfaction, though their decision satisfaction was 
generally on a different, i.e., higher level than the satisfaction of officially accountable 
decision makers. 
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5 Discussion 
This chapter will present the final discussion of the results and implications of this 
dissertation. In the first part, the hypotheses and results of the three experiments will 
be briefly summarized. Building on this, the second part will give theoretical, as well 
as managerial, implications at a more general level, before the third part outlines the 
limitations of the studies conducted. Finally, since this dissertation could not address 
all interesting factors in the three experiments, directions for future research will be 
discussed. 
5.1 Summary of Results 
From the outset, three general questions have motivated the research conducted in 
this dissertation. To ascertain that these were answered adequately by the research, 
the results of the three experiments are briefly summarized below. It will be recalled 
the questions were: 
 
1. Does choice overload exist in B2B settings, where buyers are not users of the 
products they purchase but are held accountable for their choices? 
 
2. Do different forms of accountability, i.e., informal and official accountability, 
have different effects on the decision satisfaction of a buyer, especially when 
choices from large assortments have to be made? In other words, do large 
assortments affect the satisfaction of buyers subject to informal accountability 
differently from those held officially accountable? And if so, what is the under-
lying psychological mechanism that drives these effects? 
 
3. How can decision satisfaction be improved when decision makers experience 
low levels of satisfaction arising from the joint effects of choice overload and 
accountability? Put differently, is color-coding a promising means of enhancing 
decision satisfaction in these circumstances? 
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In order to answer these three questions, chapter 2 developed a conceptual frame-
work. This framework was based on several different streams of literature: Firstly, on 
research about the effects of a large number of variants, specifically i.e., literature on 
the positive and negative effects of variety, like choice overload, secondly, on 
research about B2B decision making, for example, the concept of buying centers, 
thirdly, on literature about accountability and its effects on decision making and lastly, 
on research that was conducted to find out means of reducing negative effects of 
high variety through different forms of assortment presentation, e.g., online filters and 
color-coding. In this way, the dissertation built strongly on existing research from 
Polman (2012) on the joint effects of accountability and choice overload, as well as 
the work of van Herpen and Pieters (2007) concerning the positive effects of color-
coding for large assortments.  
Notably, these bodies of work were extended in several important ways: Regarding 
joint effects of large assortments and accountability, Polman’s (2012) results were 
complemented by the introduction of an important boundary condition, because it 
could be shown that not all forms of accountability lead to the same effects on satis-
faction when people have to conduct choices from large assortments. Also, the 
underlying psychological mechanisms that lead to choice overload in certain circum-
stances were shown. Furthermore, Polman (2012) conducted a study with a student 
sample and let subjects choose courses for the next semester, whereas in this 
dissertation, participants in the corresponding study (Experiment 1) were B2B deci-
sion makers and the focal decision was a purchase. The results of van Herpen and 
Pieters (2007) were also extended when it was demonstrated that attribute-level 
color-coding not only reduces cognitive effort for making a purchase decision, but 
also enhances decision satisfaction in certain circumstances. 
Exploring each of the experiments in further detail, Experiment 1 was designed to 
identify forms of accountability under which choice overload exists in a B2B context, 
in other words, where the satisfaction of the decision maker would be reduced when 
choosing from large assortments. As hypothesized, officially accountable decision 
makers did not experience different levels of satisfaction when choosing from small 
and from large assortments (H1A). This was due to the high cognitive effort they 
were willing to invest in the decision, as demonstrated in this study. However, as 
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predicted, informally accountable decision makers invested less effort in their deci-
sion-making and, therefore, felt less satisfied when choosing from a large compared 
to a small assortment (H1B).  
Notably, these interactive effects of accountability and assortment size were qualified 
by mediation. The effect of assortment size for informally accountable decision 
makers (moderation) affected the degree of the decision’s justifiability, which, in turn, 
affected decision satisfaction (mediation). Importantly, officially accountable decision 
makers did not experience different levels of justifiability when choosing from small 
and large assortments and, therefore, their decision satisfaction did not vary accord-
ing to assortment size. In sum, a moderated mediation regarding the interactive 
effect of assortment size and accountability that affected decision satisfaction 
through justifiability, as postulated in H2, could be shown. On a more general level, 
this demonstrates that choice overload can exist in some, but not all, B2B settings 
and the effect of reduced satisfaction can be of concern in such cases. It could also 
be shown that justifiability is an important mediator of this effect. Ultimately, research 
questions 1 and 2 were successfully answered by Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2 was designed to identify a means of enhancing satisfaction of infor-
mally accountable decision makers when making a choice from a large assortment 
and, simultaneously, ensuring that the approach used does not harm satisfaction of 
officially accountable decision makers. The form of assortment presentation was 
varied in this experiment using color-coding, where the most important attribute of a 
product was coded with a unique color. By doing so, search costs were potentially 
reduced and the choice became more mentally convenient. As hypothesized, this 
increased decision satisfaction of informally accountable decision makers (H3), while 
not affecting satisfaction of officially accountable decision makers (H4). This experi-
ment was, therefore, able to answer the third research question. However, since 
Experiment 2 used the same sample as Experiment 1, and also did not include 
unaccountable decisions makers as a possible group for comparing the effects, 
Experiment 3 was conducted to replicate and enhance these results and, thus, to 
deepen the understanding of the effects of attribute-level color-coding. 
In detail, Experiment 3 used a sample of B2C decision makers in a B2B-like situation, 
specifically, a choice of a restaurant for an anniversary of an individual’s firm, thereby 
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extending the results of Experiment 2 to a service setting. Importantly, Experiment 3 
also included non-accountable decision makers to control for how those would be 
affected by color-coding. As predicted, color-coding did not affect their decision 
satisfaction (H5) and they were, in general, more satisfied with their decision than 
accountable decision makers. This appears intuitively logical, since non-accountable 
decision makers could just decide what they themselves preferred, without having to 
justify their decision afterwards. This ought to have made the decision easier and, 
therefore, decision makers should have higher decision satisfaction. Regarding the 
decision makers held to account, the same pattern emerged as in Experiment 2, 
where officially accountable decisions makers were equally satisfied when choosing 
from a color-coded assortment as an assortment without color-coding, while infor-
mally accountable decision makers were more satisfied when choosing from the 
color-coded compared to the other assortment. 
5.2 Theoretical Contribution 
The preceding section summarized the results of the three experiments and outlined 
some of their immediate implications. The following section will now take a more 
general perspective to explain how these results contribute to the existing literature 
on a) variety seeking and choice overload, b) accountability, c) the joint effects of 
choice overload and accountability, d) B2B decision making processes and e) 
assortment presentation, particularly color-coding. 
5.2.1 Contribution to the Literature on Variety Seeking and Choice 
Overload 
It is well documented by former research that more variety is not always better and 
which circumstances influence if variety is perceived positive or negative. For exam-
ple, when consumers have an ideal product in mind they appreciate large assort-
ments, because the probability to find exactly this ideal product is very high when 
such a large number of different alternatives are offered. However, when consumers 
are not totally sure what they are looking for, a large assortment is likely to be over-
whelming, thereby reducing satisfaction (Chernev 2003b). Surprisingly, these effects 
have not been investigated in a B2B context before. This, however, is especially 
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interesting because, in practice, B2B assortments are often very large and offer a 
high number of similar product variants to match diverse customer needs (Homburg 
2012). This dissertation addresses this research gap by demonstrating that 
overchoice effects, in the form of reduced satisfaction of decision makers, can exist 
in B2B settings, but that negative effects from large assortments depend on the form 
of accountability. Thus, an understanding of variety is developed from a pure B2C 
perspective to professional buyers carrying out purchases. 
5.2.2 Contribution to the Literature on Accountability 
A growing body of literature has investigated various effects of different forms of 
accountability (see, for example, Langhe et al. 2011; Ossege 2012; Lerner & Tetlock 
1999). Thus far, though, only Doney and Armstrong’s (1996) research has investi-
gated the effects of different forms of accountability in B2B purchase decisions. This 
was also the first, and only, article to reveal the difference between informal and 
official accountability. Given that Doney and Armstrong (1996) conducted a survey 
that was purely interested in documenting the existing forms of accountability for B2B 
buyers, they did not investigate which effects these different forms of accountability 
might have in detail. Thus, this dissertation makes an important contribution to the 
research on accountability, since for informally and officially accountable buyers 
different effects on decision satisfaction were shown. Indeed, the research further 
revealed that these two forms of accountability could be successfully manipulated 
using scenarios. This broadens the possibilities for future research in B2B settings 
since it is often difficult to conduct B2B studies in laboratory settings due to the 
reluctance of B2B decision makers to participate, for example, due to time con-
straints. However, now that experiments using scenarios can be conducted online, as 
done in this dissertation, the effort for B2B decision makers to participate is reduced. 
In summary, this dissertation did not only offer a substantive contribution to existing 
research, but also contributed to the field by demonstrating that psychologically 
complex constructs like accountability can be manipulated with scenarios. 
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5.2.3 Contribution to the Research on Joint Effects of Choice Over-
load and Accountability 
As postulated in the title of this dissertation, the focal interest of the research lies in 
the joint, or, in other words, interactive effects of choice overload and accountability. 
Polman (2012) made an initial step in that direction by revealing that a large number 
of alternatives could reduce satisfaction with a choice when the decision maker is 
held accountable. These effects held true when individuals made decisions concern-
ing themselves, which equates to the typical overchoice effect already shown by prior 
research, and more importantly, when choosing for others. This dissertation 
extended Polman’s (2012) results by qualifying them on the basis of the form of 
accountability, more specifically, whether the decision maker is informally or officially 
accountable. Furthermore, the choice context was broadened to purchase decisions 
using a sample consisting of B2B buyers instead of students. Most importantly, this 
dissertation illuminated the underlying psychological processes by demonstrating that 
the interactive effect of choice overload, or, in other words, assortment size, and 
accountability on decision satisfaction is mediated by the decision’s degree of justifi-
ability. This is an important contribution to existing research because these pro-
cesses have not been shown before. 
5.2.4 Contribution to the Literature on B2B Decision Making 
Processes 
Research on B2B purchase decisions has long focused on the constitution of buying 
centers and what factors, e.g., the risk or the importance of the purchase for the 
company, influence the number of people involved into a purchase decision, i.e., the 
buying center (see, for example, Anderson et al. 1987; Reve & Johansen 1982). 
What appears equally important, but largely ignored in the existing research though, 
are the underlying psychological processes that influence how purchase decisions 
are experienced by the people conducting them. Although accountability in its various 
forms appears important in B2B settings at an intuitive level, there is a paucity of 
research on the varying effects of forms of accountability. This dissertation takes an 
important step in this direction by demonstrating the different influences of informal 
and official accountability on decision satisfaction for choices from large assortments 
97 
from a buyer’s perspective. This directly contributes to understanding when buyers’ 
satisfaction is high or low in a professional context. 
5.2.5 Contribution to the Literature on Assortment Presentation 
5.2.5.1 Contribution to the General Literature on Assortment Presentation  
This dissertation contributes to the literature on assortment presentation by showing 
that a certain form of presentation can be a mean to enhance satisfaction for other-
wise less satisfied decision makers in the case of informal accountability. At the same 
time, it was shown that neither officially accountable decision makers nor non-
accountable decision makers experience reduced decision satisfaction from a differ-
ing assortment presentation. Thus, it could be proven that not only the reduction of 
assortment size by elimination of products from the offered assortment can enhance 
satisfaction, as is often recommended and was shown as a possible way by prior 
research (see, e.g., Broniarczyk et al. 1998). Importantly, the number of options 
offered in an assortment can be kept constant, but by the way of presenting the 
assortment, satisfaction can be enhanced. This is especially important for cases 
where the number of options cannot be reduced. 
5.2.5.2 Contribution to the Literature on Color-Coding 
This dissertation not only contributed to research on assortment presentation in 
general, but, by using color-coding as a means to enhance satisfaction, it also 
contributed to this special stream of literature. This dissertation directly built on the 
design of attribute-level color-coding van Herpen and Pieters (2007) used. Their 
results were extended by showing that color-coding can enhance satisfaction – a 
construct not studied by these authors – when people have to choose from large 
assortments and that this positive effect holds true for informally, but not officially 
accountable decision makers. Importantly, satisfaction was not significantly 
enhanced for non-accountable decision makers. This constitutes a further extension 
of the van Herpen and Pieters (2007) studies. To sum up, the results reflect the 
findings of former research by showing that color-coding has positive effects under 
certain circumstances, but also showed important boundary conditions regarding its 
effects on decision satisfaction. 
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5.3 Managerial Contribution 
The results of this dissertation also have important practical implications for manag-
ers that have to decide on the assortment offered by their company. It also gives 
some hints for executive managers, since accountability is somewhat linked to the 
implementation of hierarchies and authority. 
5.3.1 Offering an Appealing Assortment 
In practice, three of Europe’s best known suppliers for surgical suture material each 
offer more than 1,200 product variants, with two offering over 1,70010, meaning a 
higher number of variants in an assortment is not a hypothetical, but rather an exist-
ing problem for many firms, especially B2B suppliers. The interviews conducted as a 
pre-study for Experiment 2 clearly revealed that some of the buyers felt overwhelmed 
by these assortments. As a result, they would often directly contact sales staff when 
searching for a certain product. From a supplier’s point of view, this can be inefficient 
because it leads to increased workloads for the sales staff without necessarily lead-
ing to higher sales. Consequently, an appealing and easy to understand assortment 
is an important component in order to compete in the market. As already explained, 
many B2B suppliers offer large assortments that, at the same time, are efficient in 
fulfilling customer needs and, therefore, do not have the potential to be reduced 
through the elimination of certain product variants from the assortment. 
Strategic considerations can also occasionally come into play. By way of example, it 
can be useful to offer variants of a product with the same basic characteristics, but a 
different number of additional features positioned in different price categories. For 
instance, when three products are offered, people often choose the one positioned in 
the middle. This is called the compromise effect (see, for example, Kivetz, Netzer & 
Srinivasan 2004). This indicates that buyers can be directed to purchase a certain 
variant by the structure of the offerings. In turn, it can be very effective when the 
variant that is bought regularly is produced very cost efficiently. Furthermore, since 
assortments offering a certain amount of variety are appealing this can lead buyers to 
                                            
10
 The three suppliers are: Covedien, Ethicon and B.Braun. Numbers are based on 2014 online 
catalogues. 
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choose a particular supplier over competitors (see, for example, Iyengar & Lepper 
2000).  
What can suppliers do, though, when they want to offer a large number of product 
variants but do not want customers to get lost when reviewing their catalogues on 
their own? How can a large assortment on a potential new supplier’s website be 
perceived as offering plenty of variety without creating cognitive overload for new 
customers? As shown in this dissertation, assortment presentation can be the key to 
offering a high number of variants while making the assortment mentally convenient 
at the same time. This could resolve the paradox of customers perceiving large 
assortments to be appealing when choosing a supplier, but finding the same assort-
ments offering too much variants and therefore leading to cognitive overload when 
making the purchasing decision. Resolving this issue will ultimately lead to higher 
decision satisfaction for customers and, when satisfaction with the product is also 
high, enhance loyalty to the supplier. 
It is easy to implement color-coding as a mean of reducing the cognitive effort of 
identifying the most important characteristics of products offered in an assortment. 
For B2C products, this strategy has, on occasion, been implemented already. For 
instance, Sarotti® uses attribute-level color-coding for its chocolates, with every 
flavor coded with a unique color. In a B2B context, color-coding can easily be applied 
to online and offline catalogues and can also be integrated into packaging design. 
Generally, managers have knowledge of the most important product attributes from 
their customers’ perspective or, if not, can survey their customers to gain this 
knowledge. 
To decide whether the implementation of color-coding is worth the effort, it is 
important for managers to have a detailed knowledge of the buying processes of their 
customers, in particular, knowledge about the people officially, as well as informally, 
involved in the purchase process. For example, does a buyer decide on her own 
what product she purchases or does she talk to the users of the product she has to 
purchase about their preferences? Does the buyer, perhaps, have to give reasons for 
the decision to her boss afterwards? In cases were informal accountability arises, for 
instance, where users do not have legitimate authority over the buyer given their 
position in a firm’s hierarchy, a buyer may still wish to incorporate their preferences 
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into her decision. At the same time, the buyer may not want to invest too much effort 
into doing so because, ultimately, this is not what she gets paid for. In such cases, 
purchasers will particularly appreciate assortments that are easy to evaluate, ena-
bling them to quickly identify the relevant products they should trade-off against one 
another and reach a final decision swiftly. Color-coding can help buyers to do so and 
will raise their satisfaction, as proven in Experiments 2 and 3 of this dissertation. The 
buyer will have the feeling she can justify her decision well and the positive effects of 
this will let her worship the corresponding supplier. This, in turn, should lead to 
greater loyalty towards the supplier, increasing the likelihood of the buyer purchasing 
from this supplier in the future.  
5.3.2 Accurate Decisions through Hierarchical Structures 
As was explained in section 2.3.2.1, accountability is sometimes seen as a promising 
means of promoting accurate decisions and stimulating higher motivation in decision 
makers to process information in greater detail. However, research has revealed that 
most forms of accountability do not have these desired effects (see, for example, 
Lerner & Tetlock 1999; Ossege 2012). As Langhe et al. (2012) demonstrated, pro-
cess accountability, which was frequently stated as enhancing decision quality, only 
improves judgments when the task is easy rather than when it is complex. Therefore, 
it is questionable whether this form of accountability will lead to better purchase 
decisions involving large and complex assortments. As this dissertation was able to 
show, however, official accountability can have this positive effect. Buyers in Experi-
ment 1 that were officially accountable had a tendency to show greater cognitive 
effort when choosing a product than those held informally accountable. This means 
that an executive manager who’s position in the hierarchy is, by definition, higher 
than the position of their subordinates, could encourage employees to make better 
decisions simply because of the legitimate authority being exercised over them. 
Importantly, managers do not have to adopt explicit mechanisms for controlling their 
subordinates’ decisions as long as subordinates believe that it is possible they could 
be asked to explain their decisions. If, for example, a firm wants buyers to incorpo-
rate user preferences, this implies that users should assert legitimate authority over 
buyers to foster buyers’ motivations to reach good decisions. This is an important 
point, since, in practice, users often do not have official authority over buyers. 
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5.4 Limitations 
Although replicating some of the findings of this dissertation (i.e., the results regard-
ing H3 and H4) in another setting to show robustness of the actual results, there are 
some limitations to the three experiments worth outlining. In particular, external 
validity is limited due to the use of scenario experiments. Notwithstanding the 
advantages of this method in studying the underlying processes of behavior, it would 
have been useful to replicate the findings in a field or, at least, laboratory, setting to 
see if they persist in these settings (Lind & Tyler 1988). 
Similarly, it would also be fruitful to use non-experimental research methods to con-
duct studies in a real-world setting and to observe how B2B buyers would react to 
large assortments and color-coding in their normal working environment. This would 
be especially worthwhile given the minor limitations of the manipulation checks in 
Experiment 3, explained in detail in 4.5.3.3. It would also be curious to see if the 
effects of large assortments and color-coding hold true in the long run, when a buyer 
has become familiar with the assortment of a supplier. Furthermore, as mentioned by 
Doney and Armstrong (1996), informal and official accountability often do not exist 
exclusively, making it useful to determine whether observed effects change when 
both forms are manipulated simultaneously, and if so, how. 
Using the same sample for Experiments 1 and 2 is an important limitation that ques-
tions the validity of the results. Although the order of the two studies was counter-
balanced and did not have a significant influence on the results, it is still possible that 
unobserved learning and/or confounding effects were present in some or all combi-
nations of the conditions in Experiments 1 and 2. However, given that the results of 
Experiment 2 were replicated using a different sample in Experiment 3 and a similar 
pattern of results was obtained, this would, in fact, seem to be of minor concern in 
this dissertation. Nonetheless, it would have been advisable to use different samples 
for each of the studies to ensure that the manipulations in the experiments did not 
affect each other.  
Furthermore, it could be argued that the sample in Experiment 3 is unsuitable 
because the participants were not B2B buyers, yet were asked to conduct a corre-
sponding purchase decision. Responding to this, first, the situation described in the 
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scenarios and the focal service (a restaurant) is not exclusive to B2B buyers. As 
explained before, although accountability is typical to B2B settings, it is not limited to 
them and a sample of consumers should not have strongly influenced the results. 
This argument is supported by the results of Experiment 2 which show exactly the 
same pattern as those of Experiment 3 concerning the hypotheses on the interaction 
effect of color-coding and accountability on decision satisfaction (H3 and H4). 
Second, prior research has been content to use a combination of B2B and B2C 
samples to show certain effects (see, e.g., Wilken et al. 2010). 
Furthermore, the moderated mediation shown in Experiment 1 was only partial, 
meaning that another, non-observed mediator has influence on the effects (Zhao et 
al. 2010). Thus, the effects of the interaction of assortment size and accountability on 
decision satisfaction (through justifiability) do exist, but do not give a complete picture 
of the underlying processes. Further investigation would be needed to completely 
understand these processes.  
In a similar vein, it is worth noting that the effects revealed were obtained in a certain 
business environment, namely hospitals, which surely differ in some respects from 
other branches in, at least, some respects. Especially in small- and medium-sized 
companies, for example, users often conduct purchase decisions themselves and, 
thus, take multiple roles, simultaneously acting as the buyer and user of a product. It 
must be possible that in such cases other patterns regarding choice behavior and 
satisfaction emerge. Furthermore, the focal assortments in this dissertation consisted 
of large numbers of relatively inexpensive products, which show certain similarities to 
commodity products in B2C settings. It is apparent that these purchase decisions 
differ significantly from investment decisions, e.g., to purchase a new assembly line 
or to build a new plant. Moreover, only standardized products were offered in the 
studies. However, as outlined previously, B2B customers have very different needs 
that strongly differ from firm to firm, which, in turn, leads many suppliers to offer 
possibilities for customizing products and services. For instance, some firms offer a 
choice of components that customers can choose among and from which products 
are then build individually. This could, of course, lead to a variation in buyers’ 
decision behaviors compared to a case where a standardized product has to be 
chosen, because the choice task itself is different. Additional research is, therefore, 
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needed to examine whether assortment size and presentation, respectively, interact 
with accountability and affect decision satisfaction, and if so, how this occurs.  
Building on these limitations just outlined, the final section will comment on promising 
avenues for future research. 
5.5 Future Research 
5.5.1 Factors that Influence the Assortment/Accountability-Relation-
ship on Decision Satisfaction 
This dissertation was carried out in order to reveal the interactive effects of assort-
ment characteristics, i.e., size and presentation of an assortment, respectively, as 
well as accountability. In an initial study, it was shown that assortment size and 
accountability affect decision satisfaction through the decision’s justifiability. Two 
further studies revealed the effects of attribute-level color-coding, one possible form 
of assortment presentation, on the decision satisfaction of accountable decision 
makers choosing from large assortments. As realistic as these situations were 
designed, and as encouraging as the results were, there can, and will, be other 
factors that influence these relationships in several ways. Consequently, this disser-
tation ought to be seen as the first step towards a better understanding of these 
relationships, which other work can now build on. A brief outline will now follow on 
how future research could deepen the understanding of the interactive relationship 
between accountability and the assortment offered. 
5.5.1.1 Characteristics of the Assortment 
Assortment size, as well as presentation, was shown to interact with accountability to 
affect decision satisfaction. However, only a small number of actual assortment sizes 
could be tested in the three experiments. It would be interesting for future research to 
explore whether the effects change for even larger assortments, and if so, how this 
occurred. As mentioned in section 5.3.1, in practice assortments can consist of 
hundreds of alternatives. Therefore, it is possible that officially accountable decision 
makers, who showed high cognitive effort and also high decision satisfaction through 
corresponding levels of justifiability regardless of assortment size, will experience 
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cognitive or, in other words, choice overload when assortments are much larger than 
those studied in this dissertation. In such instances, it is possible that their perceived 
justifiability of their decision is lowered, in turn, reducing satisfaction. When not only 
mere assortment size, but also complexity of an assortment is raised, this effect 
could be even more pronounced. Previous research by Langhe et al. (2012) has 
already shown that the complexity of a task one has to perform influences decision 
quality. Considering this in further detail, process accountable decision makers were 
able to make better judgments for easy, but not for complex, tasks. It would be very 
interesting to build on these results and test officially and informally accountable 
decision makers in a similar setting to explore whether, and if so, how, their judg-
ments differ when complexity of a choice task is high. 
Turning to assortment presentation, only color-coding on attribute-level was tested as 
a means of enhancing decision makers’ satisfaction. The rationale for this restriction 
was based on prior research of van Herpen and Pieters (2007), who showed that 
attribute-level color-coding outperforms item-level color-coding for large assortments. 
Nonetheless, it would be beneficial to test whether these results hold true under 
different forms of accountability. Van Herpen and Pieters (2007) argued that antici-
pated identification costs of the alternatives are raised when item-level color-coding 
is used for a large number of alternatives, i.e., every alterative has its unique color. 
By doing so, cognitive effort would be raised and because people are not always 
motivated to invest greater effort, presumably there will be negative consequences. 
However, it is unclear how people who are highly motivated to invest a certain 
amount of cognitive effort will be affected, for example, those held officially account-
able. It is possible that such individuals perceive an assortment with item level color-
coding differently because they do not anticipate negative consequences to arise 
from the high identification costs in case these are accompanied with high justifiability 
in their final choice. Future studies could, therefore, include other forms of color-
coding to test their effects under the different forms of accountability. This point 
would be especially interesting, because, in practice, even in a case where it can be 
assumed that most buyers of a product (e.g. chocolate) are unaccountable for their 
decision, item-level color-coding is occasionally applied. Ritter Sport®, for instance, 
uses item level color-coding for its chocolates. Here, every single item has its own, 
unique color assigned to it. The whole packaging is designed using corresponding 
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color so that a consumer standing in front of shelf can easily distinguish the different 
chocolates on offer. In such instances, though, research would suggest high identifi-
cation costs, as has already been explained.  
Prospective research should, therefore, seek to shed more light on the question of 
whether item-level color-coding can be a successful and reasonable method in 
identified circumstances. It would be sensible, though, to take not only identification 
costs, but also other variables like decision satisfaction into account, when evaluating 
this strategy. In addition, it would be fruitful to investigate real, rather than hypothet-
ical, products and brands to determinate whether consumers, for example, develop 
learning effects over time that change their evaluations of an assortment once they 
know that their favorite chocolate is the one with the dark yellow packaging. Here, 
studies could manipulate or measure if participants have an available ideal point or 
not, and compare their reactions to different forms of color-coding. 
It would also be curious to test other forms of assortment presentation with regard to 
their interactive effects with accountability and how they affect satisfaction of a deci-
sion maker. For example, online filters like the ones studied by Morales et al. (2005) 
and Diehl (2005) could have different effects on accountable decision makers. For 
them, it could be less important how much variety they perceive a supplier to offer. 
This would hint at an effect shown by earlier research, where implementing a filter 
made an assortment less attractive since it was perceived to incorporate fewer alter-
natives. Instead, though, it seems plausible to suggest that accountable decision 
makers seek to make an optimal choice from an existing assortment, regardless of 
the variety it offers. If they trust the filter of a supplier’s website to lead to better 
results, whereby they can quickly find the potentially fitting options, accountable 
decision makers ought to experience increased satisfaction when choosing from a 
filtered assortment. Future research should, therefore, test these possible effects in 
order to further understand the interaction of assortment presentation and accounta-
bility. 
In this dissertation, alignability and complementarity of product characteristics were 
studied implicitly by designing certain assortments and products with corresponding 
characteristics. Experiments 1 and 2 used alignable or, in other words, 
noncomplementary assortments, while Experiment 3 adopted a complementary 
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assortment. Prospective studies could more deeply investigate the potentially differ-
ent effects of these forms of assortments by explicitly studying whether a difference 
in decision satisfaction exists between choices from nonalignable versus comple-
mentary assortments, which are similar but, per definition, not the same (see 2.1.2). It 
would be interesting to explore how the different forms of assortments interact with 
different assortment sizes and/or forms of presentation, e.g., attribute-level compared 
to item-level color-coding. Again, it would be particularly insightful to study the corre-
sponding effects under different forms of accountability. 
Only modified rebuy situations were investigated in the experiments conducted for 
this research project. To advance the research, it would be useful to test the effects 
of different assortment sizes and presentation forms in situations with greater and 
lesser risk, such as new task or straight rebuy situations. As explained, a new task, 
for instance, would require a much more detailed elaboration of the options offered 
because the decision maker lacks experience of the important product 
characteristics. This raises the question of how, if at all, a decision maker 
experiencing higher risk and uncertainty can be guided in her choice and which forms 
of assortment presentation might play a role in this. Looking ahead, then, studies 
should incorporate different levels of risks into purchase situations and control more 
strictly for prior experience of participants with the focal product category. Indeed, 
even when studying modified rebuy situations, future research could further 
distinguish between simple and complex situations, as proposed by Bunn (1993). 
This might be especially fruitful for field studies because they offer a variety of similar, 
but not identical, situations regarding buyer power and the number of possible supply 
firms in the market. 
5.5.1.2 Possible Mediators on Decision Satisfaction 
This dissertation examined a moderated mediation for informally accountable deci-
sion makers which revealed that they are less satisfied when choosing from large 
assortments due to reduced justifiability of their own decisions. As further analysis 
proved, decision makers were not willing to invest high cognitive effort into their 
decisions. Given that the moderated mediation found in Experiment 1 is only partial, 
there must be other influencing factors within this relationship. One obvious factor is 
anticipated identification and/or decision costs (van Herpen & Pieters 2007; 
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Heitmann et al. 2007). It is surely possible that not only justifiability to others, but also 
the anticipation of the cognitive effort required to reach a good decision, influences 
the relationship of the interaction of accountability and assortment size on decision 
satisfaction.  
Another likely factor is anticipated regret, with Heitmann et al. (2007) showing that it 
influences decision satisfaction. It would be very curious to see if certain forms of 
accountability increased the anticipated regret of a decision. It is possible that infor-
mally accountable decision makers are aware of their limited motivation to invest 
sufficient cognitive effort to reach an optimal decision from a large number of alterna-
tives. Consequently, their anticipated regret could be higher which, in turn, could 
affect decision satisfaction. In the same vein, and also building on Heitmann et al. 
(2007), prospective studies could equally investigate the perceived confidence of 
decision makers as a possible mediator in the postulated relationship. 
5.5.1.3 Forms of Accountability 
As already mentioned, one can imagine that official and informal accountability not 
only exist exclusively, but, in practice, can occur at the same time (Doney & 
Armstrong 1996). Therefore, it would be promising to study the joint effects of both 
forms of accountability. This would be particularly beneficial in light of Experiment 1’s 
results which showed that when choosing form large assortments, informally 
accountable decision makers experienced a reduction in their decision satisfaction, 
unlike officially accountable buyers who did not. It remains unclear, though which 
effects would predominate in a situation where both forms of accountability are 
present. Exploratory research is needed to investigate these joint effects since it is 
quite possible that the combination of different forms of accountability lead to con-
flicting evaluations of different assortments and/or products. This, in turn, raises the 
question of how a buyer would resolve these conflicts.  
Finally, it would be worthwhile investigating how other forms of combined accounta-
bility would interact with different assortments. For example, one could examine how 
official and/or informal accountability affect the behavior of decision makers in com-
bination with process and/or outcome accountability. It is possible that process and 
official accountability, when experienced together, improve motivation to invest an 
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even higher amount of cognitive effort. In contrast, what will happen, for example, in 
the case of officially accountable decision makers who are only held accountable for 
the outcome of their decision? Will they quickly pick an option that seems appealing 
to them, and then bolster arguments why their decision was right or will they engage 
in a detailed evaluation of the alternatives offered? Again, exploratory research in the 
future could reveal these effects in detail. 
5.5.2 General Influences on the Postulated Relationships 
5.5.2.1 Influences on Variety Perceptions 
As explained in section 2.1.1, effects of one and the same assortment can differ 
depending on certain characteristics of the decision maker. For instance, different 
levels of optimum stimulation can lead some people to be overwhelmed by an 
assortment, while others will openly appreciate the variety being offered (Menon & 
Kahn 1995). OSL does not depend on accountability, but could be an important 
personal characteristic of decision makers that influences how quickly they will 
experience cognitive overload from a growing number of options. Prospective 
research should, therefore, incorporate OSL as a potential influencing factor. 
It has been revealed in earlier research that regulatory focus interacts with assort-
ment size and assortment alignability to affect choices (Som & Lee 2012). Regulatory 
focus draws a distinction between two basic motivational orientations, namely, a 
promotion and a prevention focus. Whereas a promotion focus shifts awareness to 
gains and accomplishments, a prevention focus makes safety and the prevention of 
loss more salient (Higgins 1997; Crowe & Higgins 1997). Som and Lee (2012) 
demonstrated that people with a promotion focus appreciate larger alignable assort-
ments, but experience negative effects form larger non-alignable assortments, while 
prevention focused individuals value increased assortment sizes, regardless of the 
alignability of the assortment. Thus, it would be particularly valuable to investigate 
how regulatory focus and accountability interact. It is plausible that certain forms of 
accountability prime a certain regulatory focus, e.g., that official accountability could 
encourage a prevention focus because the decision maker is afraid of making a 
mistake and fears consequences from her boss. It is, however, also feasible that 
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regulatory focus exists independent of accountability and, instead, decision satisfac-
tion is influenced by an interactive effect between these two constructs. Further 
research is required to shed light on these possible effects. 
As illustrated by Ariely and Levav (2000) and Ratner and Kahn (2002), consumers 
behave differently when choosing in private than in public, with public consumption 
often incorporating more variety than private choices. Given that decisions held to 
account are often evaluated retrospectively by other people, with the decision itself 
often being made privately, it would be useful to observe how this can affect choice 
patterns and decision satisfaction. This is especially so for B2C situations with infor-
mally versus officially accountable decision makers, since in a B2C setting decision 
makers can generally choose options more freely and based on their own prefer-
ences, than in a B2B context. 
5.5.2.2 Different Forms of Overchoice Effects 
At the beginning of this dissertation (see 2.1.2 for more details), it was mentioned 
that choice overload does not only have negative effects on satisfaction, but can also 
lead to choice delay or even deferral. In a B2B context, it seems quite implausible 
that a buyer would delay or defer her decision since it is her job to purchase and this 
often happens under time pressure. She also has to expect serious consequences if 
she does not conduct the purchase she is told to. However, because informal and 
official accountability can also exist outside a working context, it would be worthwhile 
investigating whether decision makers under certain forms of accountability tend to 
be more likely to delay or defer decisions. Therefore, future research should include 
no-choice options into experimental studies to examine these effects (for more 
details on how to design no-choice options in experimental settings see, e.g., Dhar 
1997). 
Equally reasonable in a B2B context, buyers might decide to look for another supplier 
when they are unsure of which product to select from an assortment. In this case, an 
investigation could be conducted into the attractiveness of an assortment under 
different forms of accountability, with varying assortment sizes and forms of presen-
tation. Remember that in all of the studies in this dissertation, participants had to 
choose a single option from one selected assortment. It would, therefore, be 
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insightful to compare choices among different assortments regarding a) which 
assortment is preferred by the decision makers and b) if they are more satisfied with 
the chosen product from one or other assortment. Similarly, it would be interesting to 
examine choice patterns when more than one product is bought at a time, in other 
words, when a simultaneous choice for several options is made. 
5.5.2.3 Influences of the Group 
In this dissertation, only situations involving a single person who had to make a 
decision were investigated. However, as prior research on B2B purchase processes 
has shown, there are also situations where several decision makers have to find a 
compromise and reach a joint decision (see, for example, Sheth 1973). It would, 
therefore, be fruitful to consider how group decisions under certain forms of account-
ability, and with certain assortments to choose from, are formed and influence indi-
vidual, as well as aggregate, satisfaction of the group members. Thinking about this 
further, an examination should be conducted into a group’s behavior when members 
feel either officially or informally accountable to reach a joint decision. The latter 
could be the case where colleagues of the same hierarchical level want to make a 
joint decision but are not required to do so by any external factors. This also reflects 
certain roles in a buying center, for example, the influencer who is not formally mak-
ing a decision but, because of certain knowledge, is asked for advice (Webster & 
Wind 1972). How will this shape the behavior of the group members, or, in other 
words, a buying center? What will happen if some of the people involved in the 
decision making are officially accountable and others informally accountable? Will 
advice from an informally accountable decision maker, as defined by the role of an 
influencer, be helpful? Will an influencer put enough cognitive effort into giving that 
advice? Put differently, and as Jonas et al. (2005) have shown, advisers that are held 
accountable for their decisions can suffer from a confirmation bias. Will this be the 
case for all forms of accountability? Can varying forms of accountability be explicitly 
incorporated into B2B or other group decision making situations to foster certain 
effects such as enhanced cognitive effort in decision making? To answer these 
questions work needs to be carried out to examine these effects in detail.  
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5.5.2.4 Other Constructs of Interest 
Decision satisfaction has been a focal construct in this research project due to the 
emphasis being on a buyer who is not the user of a certain product. However, 
several other constructs could be interesting for future research. Firstly, loyalty to a 
supplier could be explored as a possible consequence of decision satisfaction, as 
shown by Heitmann et al. (2007). To reveal how loyalty develops over time, and 
whether or not different forms of assortment presentation have the same effects in 
the long run, longitudinal studies with B2B buyers should be conducted. In addition, 
decision quality, that is, whether chosen products accurately fit the choice task, could 
be explored. This would require studies designed with one ideal, but not easy to 
recognize option.  
In a similar vein, information search behavior could be analyzed in greater detail to 
determine whether increased cognitive effort leads to a broader and/or deeper pro-
cessing of alternatives. Put differently, do decision makers incorporate more options 
into their trade-offs or do they pick a certain number of options and compare those 
against more attributes? Earlier research has also investigated what kind of infor-
mation, i.e., conflicting or confirming information, decision makers sought in particular 
situations (see, for example, Mojzisch et al. 2008). Studies could be developed to 
investigate these effects under informal and official accountability and also to 
incorporate a variety of assortments in order to discover if an interactive effect with 
accountability exists.  
Building on this, if not only buyers, but also users of a product are examined regard-
ing their satisfaction, it would be interesting to see whether, and if so, in what ways, 
the interaction of accountability and assortment size and/or presentation affect their 
satisfaction with a product in the short, as well as long, run. In doing so, this would 
once again generate further insights into long-term loyalty of customers to suppliers 
that offer certain assortments. 
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7 Appendices 
7.1 Appendix 1: Stimuli Used in Experiment 1 
Large Assortment: 
Name Description Material Care Instructions Price in € Available Colors & Sizes 
Steffi 
straight cut, 2 front 
pockets, 1 hip patch 
pocket, pockets on the 
right trouser leg 
65% 
polyester, 
35% cotton 
machine wash hot, 
chlorine 
bleachable 
35.99 
navy blue : XS – XXXL 
rose: S – XXXL 
white:  XS – XXXL 
lime:  M – XXL 
Kerstin 
straight cut, 2 hip 
patch pockets 
50% 
polyester, 
50% cotton 
machine wash hot, 
chlorine 
bleachable 
31.99 
yellow: S – XXL 
violet: XS – XXL 
white:  S – XXL 
green: XS – XXXL 
red: XS – XL 
  
X
IX
 
Patricia 
straight cut, 1 hip 
patch pocket , one 
pocket on every 
trouser leg 
50% 
polyester, 
50% cotton 
machine wash hot, 
chlorine 
bleachable 
33.99 
dark green: XS – XXL 
red:  XS – XXL 
white: XS – XXL 
light blue: S – L 
peach: M - XXXL 
Sylvia 
straight cut, 
1 hip patch pocket 
100 % cotton 
machine wash 
warm, do not 
bleach 
32.99 
 
white: 
XS – XXXL 
chocolate brown: 
S – XXXL 
light yellow: 
M – L 
dark red: 
XS – XXL 
mint green: 
XS – XXL 
 
  
X
X
 
Verena 
Boot cut, 2 pockets in 
the front, 1 hip patch 
pocket  
50% 
polyester, 
50% cotton 
machine wash hot, 
chlorine 
bleachable 
39.95 
beige: XS – L 
dark blue:  XS – L 
black:  XS – L 
 emerald green: XS – XXL 
fiery red: XS – XXL 
Linda 
Straight cut, pockets 
at the sides, 1 hip 
patch pocket 
100% 
polyester 
machine wash at 
60°C, do not 
bleach 
30.95 
pastel green: XS – XXL 
dark red:  XS – XXL 
ocean blue:  XS – XXL 
Marion 
boot cut, pockets at 
the sides, 1 hip patch 
pocket 
100% cotton 
machine wash hot, 
chlorine 
bleachable 
37.99 
 
lemon: S – XXL 
white:  S – XXL 
navy blue:  S – XXL 
 pastel green: S – L 
pale pink: XS – XL 
 
  
X
X
I 
Sandra 
straight cut, 
1 hip pocket 
50 % 
polyester, 
50 % cotton 
machine wash hot, 
chlorine 
bleachable 
39.95 
light brown: 
S – XXL 
mandarin orange: 
S – XXL 
grey: 
S – XXL 
white: 
S – XXL 
Marina 
straight cut, hip patch 
pockets, 2 pockets at 
the sides 
98% cotton, 
2% elastane 
machine wash hot, 
chlorine 
bleachable 
33.95 
olive green: XS – L 
mint green:  XS – XXL 
light brown: XS – L 
red: XS –XXL 
Helga 
2 pockets on the front, 
light material 
100% cotton 
machine wash hot, 
chlorine 
bleachable 
38.99 
violet:  XS – XXL 
sand: XS – XXL 
rose:  XS – XXL 
light blue:  XS – XXL 
  
X
X
II 
 
Samira 
Boot cut, 2 pockets at 
the sides 
50% 
polyester, 
50% cotton 
machine wash at 
60°C 
30.00 
 
lime: S – XL 
lilac:  S – XL 
white:  S – XL 
maroon: XS – XXL 
light green: XS – XXL 
 
Maika 
2 hip patch pockets, 
very light material 
100% cotton 
machine wash hot, 
chlorine 
bleachable 
34.95 
 
turquoise: S – XXL 
black:  S – XXL 
magenta:  S – XXL 
violet:  S – XXL 
rose: XS – M 
 
  
X
X
III 
Small Assortment: 
Name Description Material Care Instructions Price in € Available Colors & Sizes 
Steffi 
straight cut, 2 front 
pockets, 1 hip patch 
pocket, pockets on the 
right trouser leg 
65% 
polyester, 
35% cotton 
machine wash hot, 
chlorine 
bleachable 
35.99 
 
navy blue : XS – XXXL 
rose: S – XXXL 
white:  XS – XXXL 
lime:  M – XXL 
Kerstin 
straight cut, 2 hip 
patch pocktes 
50% 
polyester, 
50% cotton 
machine wash hot, 
chlorine 
bleachable 
31.99 
 
yellow: S – XXL 
violet: XS – XXL 
white:  S – XXL 
green: XS – XXXL 
red: XS – XL 
 
 
  
X
X
IV
 
Sylvia 
straight cut, 
1 hip patch pocket 
100 % cotton 
machine wash 
warm, do not 
bleach 
32.99 
white: 
XS – XXXL 
chocolate brown: 
S – XXXL 
light yellow: 
M – L 
dark red: 
XS – XXL 
mint green: 
XS – XXL 
Sandra 
straight cut, 
1 hip pocket 
50 % 
polyester, 
50 % cotton 
machine wash hot, 
chlorine 
bleachable 
39.95 
light brown: 
S – XXL 
mandarin orange: 
S – XXL 
grey: 
S – XXL 
white: 
S – XXL 
  
X
X
V
 
 
Marina 
straight cut, hip patch 
pockets, 2 pockets at 
the sides 
98% cotton, 
2% elastane 
machine wash hot, 
chlorine 
bleachable 
33.95 
 
olive green: XS – L 
mint green:  XS – XXL 
light brown: XS – L 
red: XS –XXL 
 
Maika 
2 hip patch pockets, 
very light material 
100% cotton 
machine wash hot, 
chlorine 
bleachable 
34.95 
 
turquoise: S – XXL 
black:  S – XXL 
magenta:  S – XXL 
violet:  S – XXL 
rose: XS – M 
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7.2 Appendix 2: Stimuli Used in Experiment 2 
Note: Only the color-coded assortment is shown here because the only aspect 
in which the two assortments differ is the color-coding, all other information are 
exactly the same. 
 
Legend for the Color-Coding: 
Gynecology: • 
Urology: • 
Skin closure, 
intracutaneous: • 
Skin closure, 
subcutaneous: • 
Visceral surgery: • 
Plastic surgery: • 
Cardiosurgery: • 
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Vascular surgery: • 
Neurosurgery: • 
Ophthalmology: • 
Oral surgery: • 
Orthopedics: • 
Odontology: • 
 X
X
V
III 
Color-Coded Assortment: 
Fields of application Name Material Applications 
Color of 
Material Absorption Structure 
Price in € (36 
pieces) 
•••• Caprone Tech 10 Polyglecaprone 25 
 
gynecology 
urology 
skin closure 
(subcutaneous, 
intracutaneous) 
uncolored 
violet 
approx. 90 – 
120 days 
mono-
filament 
99.00 
•••••• Glyco 50 Glyconate 
 
visceral surgery 
gynecology 
urology 
plastic surgery 
skin closure 
(subcutaneous, 
intracutaneous) 
uncolored 
approx. 60 – 90 
days 
mono-
filament 
185.00 
 X
X
IX
 
••• Lactil 910 Polyglactine 910 
 
gynecology 
skin closure 
(subcutaneous, 
intracutaneous) 
 
uncolored 
violet 
approx. 56 – 70 
days 
multi-
filament 
125.00 
•• Novo Med 90 Polyester (PET) 
cardio-surgery 
vascular surgery 
white 
green 
none 
multi-
filament 
68.00 
•••• Novo Tech 90 Polyester 
 
neurosurgery 
ophthalmology 
oral surgery 
orthopedics 
white 
green 
none 
multi-
filament 
79.00 
•• Novomix 30 Polypropylene & Polyethylene 
 
cardiosurgerry 
vascular surgery 
 
black 
green 
 
none 
mono-
filament 
97.00 
 X
X
X
 
••••• Poly 1000 Polyglycolic Acid 
 
gynecology 
urology 
plastic surgery 
skin closure 
(subcutaneous, 
intracutaneous) 
uncolored 
violet 
approx. 60 – 90 
days 
multi-
filament 
115.00 
••••• Poly 2000 Polyglycolic Acid 
 
gynecology 
urology 
plastic surgery 
skin closure 
(subcutaneous, 
intracutaneous) 
uncolored 
violet 
approx. 60 – 90 
days 
mono-
filament 
165.00 
••• Poly 3000 Polyglycolic Acid 
 
gynecology 
ophthalmology 
odontology 
uncolored 
violet 
approx. 45 days 
multi-
filament 
165.00 
 X
X
X
I 
••• Prop 1400 Polypropylene 
 
plastic surgery 
skin closure 
(subcutaneous, 
intracutaneous) 
blue 
black 
none 
mono-
filament 
105.00 
•••• Prop Med 700 Polypropylene 
neurosurgery 
ophthalmology 
skin closure 
(subcutaneous, 
intracutaneous) 
uncolored 
green 
none 
mono-
filament 
75.00 
••• Six Tech Polyamide 6 
ophthalmology 
skin closure 
(subcutaneous, 
intracutaneous) 
white 
blue 
black 
none 
mono-
filament 
100.00 
•• Sync 100 Polyamide 
 
neurosurgery 
ophthalmology 
white 
blue 
black 
none 
mono-
filament 
79.00 
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7.3 Appendix 3: Stimuli Used in Experiment 3 
Description of the Restaurants: 
Kochkunst: Experience our dishes with the tastes of summer in an elegant 
atmosphere with candlelight and champagne as well as our wine specialties. 
We serve a set meal that will surprise you. We also serve vegetarian dishes. 
Enjoy the great view over fields and woods from our terrace on the fifth floor or 
relax inside in an elegant ambience with candlelight. Unfortunately, a return with 
public transportation is not possible after 10 pm. Of course, we are happy to call 
a taxi for you (travel time to city center: approx. 20 min.). We are looking 
forward to welcome you as our guests! 
Zum Brauhäuschen: Eat at rustic tables, typical for a brewery pub, and enjoy 
the lively atmosphere in our “Brauhausstube”. Don’t go home hungry because 
we serve good and solid portions of food. Enjoy plain fare in high quality. All our 
dishes are cooked on order. Of course, we serve a variety of tasty vegetarian 
dishes. Try our well-known homebrew! Please be aware that our traditional 
brewery pub does not have a terrace to eat outside. To make you feel most 
comfortable, all our rooms are air-conditioned during summer. “Zum 
Brauhäuschen” – that’s rustic coziness in the heart of the city! 
Asia Royal: When visiting us, you will experience a culinary explosion: The 
inimitable art of Sushi making and Asian-style high quality specialties with fish, 
meat or vegetables. Relax in a stylish lounge-like atmosphere and enjoy one of 
our world-famous cocktails… Take some time to relax in our “Asia Garden” – a 
unique terrace, designed in the spirit of feng shui. A place of silence, all calm 
and peaceful while located in the middle of the lively city center. We are sure 
here you’ll find calmness and inner peace! Asia Royal, the unique spirit! 
Bella Italia: Pizza, pasta, salads – that’s the Italian lifestyle and our specialty! 
We serve food for every taste, no matter if you prefer fish or meat, and for 
people of every age. We serve food that makes you happy with Italian 
hospitality, no-frills style and in a family-like atmosphere. We serve – what else 
could it be?! – only Italian wines. Enjoy our homemade Tiramisu along with an 
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espresso for dessert which is worth the peccadillo. During summer we put some 
tables in front of our restaurant for you – just like in Italy! 
Just Burger: Like an American diner we serve fresh-made burgers from 100 % 
beef.  As side dishes, we offer fresh salads with a large choice of dressings as 
well as homemade fries – because we love potatoes! We serve as many 
variants of burgers as you can imagine: Choose from 10 different sauces, if you 
like cucumber, tomato or both on you burger, choose your favorite bread, your 
preferred cheese and many more!  You can also get all of our products for take-
away so that you can enjoy eating in the nearby park. Where we are? Right 
next to the university (approx. 15 min. from the city center). 
1001 Nacht: Be our guest and enjoy a journey full of scents, tastes and spices 
like in the story of “thousand-and-one night”. Our traditional, Arabian dishes 
offer you delicious meat or vegetables with exotic spices. The atmosphere in 
our restaurant will becharm you and your comfort is our highest priority. We try 
to read your every wish from your lips. Please understand that we do not serve 
alcoholic beverages due to our cultural traditions. Enjoy an Ayran, a very 
cooling and fresh drink, on our lovely terrace with view on the woods instead – 
you will be positively surprised by the taste! 
Veggie Delight: Are you sick of only getting enormous portions of meat and only 
pasta with tomato sauce as a vegetarian dish? Are you sick of non-organic 
food? Come visit us and enjoy solely vegetarian and fresh-made organic food! 
To offer you the most fresh and seasonable food, we offer four varying dishes a 
day. Small variety, but good choice, we think! Would you like a glass of juice or 
wine? It’s all organic as well! We moved to the city center recently. Just come 
on over and have a look at our new, bright and comfortable rooms that welcome 
you to stay for a little while… 
Formitable: We offer piano music on every weekend and a dinner in a high-
class atmosphere. We only serve the highest quality and the most premium 
ingredients. Our specialty is fine fish and seafood. We also offer culinary 
highlights with exclusive meat.  We are proud to offer you a large number of 
exclusive wines. We were awarded for our wines and our dishes several times. 
Since we are located in the countryside, far away from the noise of the city, you 
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can enjoy your dinner in our nice garden, of course, with all perfect service and 
a high quality experience as well. It would be our greatest pleasure to welcome 
you as our guest soon! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
